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Abstract
With a long history in international law, the concept of  due diligence has recently gained 
traction in the cyber context, as a promising avenue to hold states accountable for harmful 
cyber operations originating from, or transiting through, their territory, in the absence of  
attribution. Nonetheless, confusion surrounds the nature, content and scope of  due diligence. 
It remains unclear whether it is a general principle of  international law, a self-standing obli-
gation or a standard of  conduct, and whether there is a specific rule requiring diligent behav-
iour in cyberspace. This has created an ‘all-or-nothing’ discourse: either states have agreed to 
a rule or principle of  ‘cyber due diligence’, or no obligation to behave diligently would exist 
in cyberspace. We propose to shift the debate from label to substance, asking whether states 
have duties to protect other states and individuals from cyber harms. By revisiting traditional 
cases, as well as surveying recent state practice, we contend that – whether or not there is 
consensus on ‘cyber due diligence’ – a patchwork of  different protective obligations already 
applies, by default, in cyberspace. At their core is a flexible standard of  diligent behaviour re-
quiring states to take reasonable steps to prevent, halt and/or redress a range of  online harms.
1 Introduction
Due diligence has recently become a buzzword in the ‘cyber domain’. The renewed inter-
est in the concept can be explained by the persistent challenges of  factually and legally 
attributing malicious cyber operations to states. Anonymizing and rerouting techniques, 
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such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and other internet protocol (IP) spoofing soft-
ware, have compounded the attribution problem.1 In this context of  great uncertainty 
and increased cyber threats, due diligence features as a promising route to accountability, 
peace and security in cyberspace: it requires states to employ their best efforts to pre-
vent, halt and redress a range of  known or foreseeable cyber harms emanating from or 
transiting through their territory, regardless of  who or what caused them. For instance, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, EU member states have ‘call[ed] upon every country to 
exercise due diligence and take appropriate actions against actors conducting [malicious 
cyber operations] from its territory, consistent with international law’.2
Yet controversy remains as to whether states are bound by an obligation to behave 
diligently in cyberspace, an area of  state activity that comprises information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs) having a physical, logical and personal dimension.3 
On the one hand, the 2015 report by the United Nations Group of  Governmental 
Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of  
International Security (hereinafter ‘GGE’), adopted by consensus by the UN General 
Assembly,4 indicates that states ‘should not knowingly allow their territory to be used 
for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs’.5 The provision is explicitly framed as a 
1 Buchan, ‘Cyberspace, Non-State Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm’, 21 Journal 
of  Conflict & Security Law (JCSL) (2016) 429, at 432.
2 Council of  the European Union, Press Release, ‘Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell, on 
Behalf  of  the European Union, on Malicious Cyber Activities Exploiting the Coronavirus Pandemic’ (30 
April 2020), available at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/30/declaration-
by-the-high-representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-malicious-cyber-activi-
ties-exploiting-the-coronavirus-pandemic/. A similar statement was made by the European Union and 
endorsed by member states during the UN Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Cyber Stability and 
Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building: see Pawel Herczynski, Statement on behalf  of  the European 
Union (20 May 2020), at 2, available at https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/20_05_22_
arria_cyber_eu_statement_as_delivered_unread_paras.pdf. See also, e.g., Mona Juul, Ambassador, Joint 
statement from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway at the Arria-Meeting on Cyber Stability 
and Conflict Prevention (22 May 2020), available at www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/statements/secu-
rity-council/2020/arria-cyber-stability-and-conflict-prevention. Along the same lines, but without expli-
citly mentioning due diligence, see Republic of  Poland, Statement by H.E. Tadeusz Chomicki Ambassador 
for Cyber & Tech Affairs Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (2020), at 1, available at https://vm.ee/sites/default/
files/Estonia_for_UN/statement_of_poland_arria_un_sc_on_cyber_22.05.2020.pdf; Italy’s Statement 
at the Arria Formula Meeting on Cyber Stability, Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building (2020), at 
1, available at https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/riunione_del_cds_in_formato_arria.pdf. 
It is also worth noting that over 130 scholars and practitioners acting in their individual capacity ac-
cepted that states already have obligations to prevent malicious cyber operations emanating from their 
territory or jurisdiction against the healthcare sector, especially during the COVID-19 outbreak: see The 
Oxford Statement on the International Law Protections Against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health 
Care Sector, available at https://elac.web.ox.ac.uk/the-oxford-statement-on-the-international-law-pro-
tections-against-cyber-operations-targeting-the-hea (last visited 10 July 2021).
3 Sullivan, ‘The 2014 Sony Hack and the Role of  International Law’, 8 Journal of  National Security Law and 
Policy (2015) 437, at 454 n.88. See also Tsagourias, ‘The Legal Status of  Cyberspace’, in N. Tsagourias 
and R. Buchan (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 13; Johnson and Post, 
‘Law and Borders: The Rise of  Law in Cyberspace’, 48 Stanford Law Review (1996) 1367.
4 GA Res. 70/237, 30 December 2015, §§ 1–2(a).
5 Report of  the Group of  Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of  Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of  International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174, 22 July 2015, § 13(c) 






/ejil/article/32/3/771/6356808 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2021
‘Cyber Due Diligence’: A Patchwork of  Protective Obligations in International Law 773
‘voluntary, non-binding norm’ of  responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. On the 
other hand, the group of  experts involved in the second edition of  the Tallinn Manual 
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (hereinafter ‘the Tallinn Manual’) 
agreed that a general rule or principle of  this kind already exists in customary inter-
national law, and is applicable in cyberspace.6 Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual requires a 
state to ‘exercise due diligence in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infra-
structure under its governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect 
the rights of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other states’.7 On their 
face, these views seem irreconcilable, and neither of  them has gone unchallenged.8
We contend that the current debate misses the point by focusing too much on the 
meaning of  ‘due diligence’ and its applicability to cyberspace. This has resulted in 
binary, ‘all-or-nothing’ views: either consensus has been reached on what is ‘cyber 
due diligence’ or there would be a legal gap in protection – states would have no 
binding obligations but only voluntary undertakings to behave diligently in their use 
of  ICTs. The confusion partly stems from the inconsistent use of  the label ‘due dili-
gence’ as a general principle of  law or international law, one or more state obligations 
or a standard of  behaviour applying in different areas of  international law.9
6 M. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2nd ed. 2017) 30, rule 6; 43, rule 7 (hereinafter Tallinn Manual 2.0).
7 Ibid., at 30. The Manual is the result of  the work of  a group of  experts and seeks to comprehensively ana-
lyse how international law applies in cyberspace.
8 For instance, Jensen and Watts are cautious about the legal basis of  this rule, recognizing its advan-
tages but also warning about its drawbacks. See Jensen and Watts, ‘A Cyber Duty of  Due Diligence: 
Gentle Civilizer or Crude Destabilizer?’, 95 Texas Law Review (2017) 1555, at 1568–1575. With respect 
to the supposed burden that the GGE recommendation would impose on states, making them wary to 
accept it, see L. Adamson, ‘Recommendation 13(c)’, in United Nations Office of  Disarmament Affairs, 
Voluntary, Non-Binding Norms for Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of  Information and Communications 
Technology: A Commentary (2017) 49, at 55, § 12. At least four states (Argentina, Israel, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom) have expressed scepticism about the rule: see Argentina, Statement at the 
2nd substantive session of  the open-ended working group on developments in the field of  information 
and telecommunications in the context of  international security (hereinafter ‘OEWG’) (11 February 
2020), available at https://media.un.org/en/asset/k18/k18w6jq6eg (timestamp 02:15:05, herein-
after ‘Argentina’s OEWG Statement’); Schondorf, ‘Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues 
Concerning the Application of  International Law to Cyber Operations’, EJIL: Talk! (9 December 2020), 
available at www.ejiltalk.org/israels-perspective-on-key-legal-and-practical-issues-concerning-the-
application-of-international-law-to-cyber-operations/; and, albeit in a less clear-cut way, New Zealand, 
The Application of  International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace (1 December 2020), § 17, available 
at https://dpmc.govt.nz/publications/application-international-law-state-activity-cyberspace; United 
Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, United Nations Group of  Governmental Experts on Advancing 
Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of  International Security: Application of  
International Law to States’ Conduct In Cyberspace (3 June 2021), available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/application-of-international-law-to-states-conduct-in-cyberspace-uk-state-
ment, para 10.
9 See McDonald, ‘The Role of  Due Diligence in International Law’, 68 International and Comparative Quarterly 
(ICLQ) (2019) 1041, at 1043–1044  n.13; Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of  
Public International Law (MPEPIL)  (2010), paras 1–2, available at opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1034?prd=EPIL (referring to due diligence as ‘an 
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To avoid those confusions and contradictions, we propose to shift the debate from 
label to substance. Rather than inquiring whether ‘due diligence’ applies in cyber-
space, the question we should be asking is to what extent states have obligations to 
protect other states and individuals from cyber harms. In answering this question, 
we conclude that whether or not a general principle of  due diligence applies to ICTs 
or a binding, cyber-specific ‘due diligence rule’ exists, states continue to be bound by 
a patchwork of  duties to prevent, stop and redress harm applying by default to cyber-
space. These ‘protective obligations’ are grounded in several primary rules of  inter-
national law enshrining a standard of  due diligence – that is, obligations that require 
states to exert their best efforts in preventing, halting and redressing a variety of  
harms, online and offline.
This article begins, in Section 2, by explaining why, despite the longstanding con-
fusion surrounding its exact meaning and scope, we believe that  ‘due diligence’ in 
international law is better understood as a standard of  conduct. This standard usually 
refers to harm prevention, mitigation and redress, but it varies across the different 
‘protective’ obligations where it is found, as well as the states, circumstances and fields 
in which they apply. Examples include international environmental law, law of  the 
sea, diplomatic protection, international investment law, international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law, under treaty or customary international 
law.10
Section 3 then explains why the entirety of  international law – including the said 
‘protective’ obligations – applies by default to cyberspace, in the absence of  a rule to 
the contrary. This claim is backed by evidence of  relevant state practice and expres-
sions of  opinio juris.
In what is this article’s main contribution to the current academic debate, Section 
4 maps out four sets of  protective duties requiring states to prevent, halt or redress 
certain harms by behaving diligently in cyberspace. Two of  these can be traced to 
primary obligations of  general international law: (i) the duty of  states not to know-
ingly allow their territory to be used for acts that are contrary to the rights of  third 
states, articulated in the Corfu Channel case,11 which we call the ‘Corfu Channel’ prin-
ciple;12 and (ii) states’ duty to prevent and remedy significant transboundary harm, 
even if  caused by lawful activities, known as the ‘no-harm’ principle.13 In addition, 
specific bodies of  international law establish due diligence duties which also apply to 
cyberspace. Of  particular relevance to ICTs are: (iii) the obligation of  states to pro-
tect human rights within their jurisdiction; and (iv) states’ duties to ensure respect 
10 Koivurova, supra note 9, paras 29–31, 45.
11 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 22 (herein-
after ‘Corfu Channel’).
12 See Reinisch and Beham, ‘Mitigating Risks: Inter-State Due Diligence Obligations in Case of  Harmful 
Cyber-Incidents and Malicious Cyber-Activity – Obligations of  the Transit State’, 58 German Yearbook of  
International Law (GYIL) (2015) 101, at 106 (framing the Corfu Channel principle as a ‘conflict-related 
no harm rule’).
13 See Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ 
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for international humanitarian law and to adopt precautionary measures against the 
effects of  attacks in the event of  an armed conflict. We locate the legal basis of  each 
of  those primary rules in customary or conventional international law, unpack the 
various standards of  due diligence they enshrine and explore the extent to which they 
apply to states’ use of ICTs.
Lastly, Section 5 demonstrates that, despite their multifaceted nature, common fea-
tures belie different protective obligations. As such, they might apply concurrently 
and inform one another’s interpretation in cyberspace and beyond.
The ‘patchwork approach’ marks a paradigm shift in the understanding and con-
ceptualization of  international law concerning diligent state behaviour in cyberspace. 
Though not a silver bullet against current cybersecurity challenges, we conclude that 
this international legal ‘patchwork’ of  protective obligations does provide a solid and 
comprehensive legal basis for harm prevention and accountability.
2 The Nature and Function of  Due Diligence in 
International Law
Despite the renewed interest in due diligence,14 the concept is not new. Its modern ori-
gins can be traced back to a series of  19th and early 20th century arbitrations relating 
to the protection of  aliens abroad.15 Already at that time, due diligence was linked to 
a positive obligation of  conduct, a ‘best efforts’ duty, requiring states to act with rea-
sonable care in the circumstances, and holding them responsible for wilfully negligent 
omissions. Later on, the Island of  Palmas arbitral award found that such obligation is a 
corollary of  states’ sovereign rights over their territory, requiring them to protect the 
rights of  other states therein.16 Since then, the concept has evolved alongside several 
primary rules of  international law.
First, in the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) held that ‘it is 
every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary 
to the rights of  other States’,17 most – but not all – of  which constitute internation-
ally wrongful acts.18 This duty, framed as a ‘well-recognized principle of  international 
14 For general studies on the topic, see, e.g., International Law Association (ILA), Study Group on Due 
Diligence, 2nd Report (2016), available at www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups labelled as ‘Draft 
Study Group Report Johannesburg 2016.pdf ’ (hereinafter ‘ILA Study’). Koivurova, supra note 9; 
H. Krieger, A. Peters, and L. Kreuzer (eds), Due Diligence and Structural Change in the International Legal 
Order (2020); J. Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law (2016); Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence 
Rule and the Nature of  the International Responsibility of  States’, 35 GYIL (1992) 9.
15 See, e.g., Alabama Claims (United States v UK) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, at 127, 129, 131–132; Wipperman 
(United States v Venezuela) (1887), reprinted in J. Bassett Moore, History and Digest of  the International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, vol. 3 (1898) 3039, at 3041; Neer (United States v 
Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60, at 61–62.
16 Island of  Palmas (or Miangas) (United States v Netherlands), 4 April 1928, II RIAA 829 (1928), ICGJ 392 
(PCA 1928), at 839 (hereinafter ‘Island of  Palmas’).
17 Corfu Channel, Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), at 22 (emphasis added).
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law’, applies generally to all states,19 and a failure to exercise the requisite degree of  
diligence gives rise to state responsibility.20
Second, as a result of  the growing concern over environmental harm and other haz-
ards crossing national borders, due diligence also features in the general obligation not 
to cause significant transboundary harm to persons, property or the environment.21 
This obligation exists at least since 1941, when the Trail Smelter arbitral tribunal found 
that a state ‘owes at all times a duty to protect other states against injurious acts by 
individuals from within their jurisdiction’.22 Likewise, Article 3 of  the International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of  Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities recognizes a duty of  States to ‘take all appropriate meas-
ures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk 
thereof ’.23 This provision mirrors customary international law,24 and is, according to 
the ILC, an ‘obligation of  due diligence’, requiring states not to successfully prevent or 
halt significant transboundary harm, but ‘to exert [their] best possible efforts to min-
imize [such] risk’.25 The customary basis of  this duty, known as the ‘no-harm’ or ‘good 
neighbourliness’ principle, has also been affirmed by the ICJ,26 which noted its origins 
in the broader ‘principle of  prevention’, alongside the Corfu Channel principle.27
Similar duties to behave diligently exist under international human rights law 
(IHRL). These are positive obligations of  states to protect and ensure individual human 
rights, whether online or offline,28 to the extent possible.29 Likewise, the duties to en-
sure respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and to take precautions to pro-
tect civilians against the effects of  attacks during armed conflict are also obligations to 
exercise due diligence.30 And other more or less specific duties of  reasonable care arise 
in respect of  different harms, such as the duty to prevent genocide under Article I of  
the Genocide Convention,31 the obligation to prevent marine pollution,32 the duty to 
19 Corfu Channel, Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), at 22.
20 See International Law Commission (ILC), Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, GA Res. 56/83, 12 December 2000, art. 14(3) (hereinafter ‘ARSIWA’).
21 See ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention of  Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, 
in Report of  the International Law Commission on the work of  its fifty-third session (23 April–1 June and 
2 July–10 August 2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, 144, at 148–149 (hereinafter ‘Draft Articles on Prevention’). 
See also Brunée and Meshel, ‘Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: International Environmental Law Lessons for 
Cyberspace Governance’, 58 GYIL (2015) 129, at 134–135; Koivurova, supra note 9, paras 16, 23, 44–45.
22 Trail Smelter (United States v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1911, at 1963.
23 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21.
24 Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 10.
25 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 154, Commentary to art. 3, para. 7.
26 Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996) 226, para. 2 
(hereinafter ‘Nuclear Weapons’).
27 Pulp Mills, Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), para. 101.
28 See also United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), Res. 32/13 (‘The promotion, protection and en-
joyment of  human rights on the Internet’), UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/13, 1 July 2016, § 1.
29 See generally Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 45.
30 Ibid., para. 31.
31 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 1948, 78 UNTS 277, art. 1 
(hereinafter Genocide Convention). See also Application of  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of  the Crime of  Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, 
ICJ Reports (2007) 43, paras 430–431.
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ensure that mining activities in the deep seabed area do not cause damage to the envir-
onment and human life33 and duties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution 
of  transnational crime.34
This variety of  primary rules recognizing a duty of  reasonable care suggests that 
‘due diligence’ itself  is simply a standard of  behaviour that is found in different ‘pro-
tective’ obligations and varies across different fields, duty-bearers and factual cir-
cumstances.35 Thus, references made in the literature to ‘due diligence obligations’ or 
‘duties of  due diligence’ seem to be a shorthand for a series of  obligations which have 
in common the imposition of  a preventive or remedial duty, compliance with which 
is measured against a certain standard of  diligent behaviour.36 Thus, lack of  due dili-
gence gives rise to a breach of  an international obligation, in the same way that negli-
gence, or lack of  reasonable care, entails a breach of  a duty of  care in many domestic 
legal systems.37 As the International Law Association (ILA) found in its recent study 
on the topic:
At its heart, due diligence is concerned with supplying a standard of  care against which fault can 
be assessed. It is a standard of  reasonableness, of  reasonable care, that seeks to take account of  the 
consequences of  wrongful conduct and the extent to which such consequences could feasibly 
have been avoided by the State or international organisation that either commissioned the rele-
vant act or which omitted to prevent its occurrence.38
Those various duties primarily seem to involve a triangular relationship between (i) 
the duty-bearer, i.e. the state having an obligation to behave diligently in preventing, 
halting or redressing the harm or the risk thereof; (ii) the source of  harm, i.e. the state, 
non-state entity or natural event causing the harm; and (iii) the beneficiary of  the 
duty, i.e. the state or non-state entity suffering the consequences of  the harm.39 It is 
for this reason that we conceptualize and frame these duties as ‘protective obligations’, 
in that they require the duty-bearer to behave diligently in protecting the beneficiary 
against harm. Possible sources of  harm include state agents, private individuals acting 
alone or in groups, as well as corporations. Beneficiaries, who may or may not hold 
a specific right vis-à-vis the duty-bearer, could be other states, individuals or private 
companies.40 When the duty-bearer state is the very source of  the harm affecting an 
33 Ibid., arts 139, 153(4) and Annex III, art. 4(4). See also Responsibilities and Obligations of  States with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports (2011) 10, paras 
107–123, 136, 141–142, 147, 189, 217, 219, 239.
34 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, 1999, 2178 UNTS 
197, art. 18; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, 2225 UNTS 
209, art. 7.
35 See Krieger and Peters, ‘Due Diligence and Structural Change in the International Legal Order’, in 
Krieger, Peters and Kreuzer, supra note 14. See also McDonald, supra note 9.
36 See Koivurova, supra note 9, paras 8–9.
37 Kolb, ‘Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace’, 58 GYIL (2015) 113, at 116; Jensen and 
Watts, supra note 8, at 1566; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 14, at 40, 42; Neer (United States v Mexico) 
(1926) 4 RIAA 60, at 61.
38 ILA Study, supra note 14, at 2 (emphasis added). See also Kulesza, supra note 14, at 262–270.
39 Besson, ‘Due Diligence and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations – Mind the Gap!’, 9 ESIL Reflections 
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individual or an object, and the relationship with the beneficiary is linear rather than 
triangular, whether or not the protective duty is one of  due diligence depends on the 
primary obligation in question. The Corfu Channel principle seems to be limited to 
a duty to prevent third-party activities that cannot be attributed to the duty-bearer 
state.41 In contrast, the no-harm principle,42 duties to protect and ensure human 
rights43 and obligations to take precautions under IHL44 all seem to apply not only 
to cases where the duty-bearer state fails to prevent harm by third parties but also 
where the state itself causes the harm in question and thereby fails to prevent, stop or 
redress it.
Thus, protective obligations have been commonly associated with the idea that 
states must behave diligently with a view to preventing, stopping or redressing a var-
iety of  harms or risks to persons, property or territory, ranging from internationally 
wrongful acts to lawful activities or even accidents. Each primary obligation to exer-
cise due diligence is triggered and limited by a variety of  factors, including (i) the exist-
ence of  a specific type of  harm or risk; (ii) the crossing of  a threshold of  seriousness of  
this harm or risk; (iii) a nexus between the state and the harm or risk in question; (iv) 
some degree of  knowledge of  the harm or risk; and (v) a state’s capacity to act in the cir-
cumstances.45 However, as will become clearer in the following sections, each of  those 
elements might differ across various protective duties.
We contend that these duties, found in different branches of  conventional and cus-
tomary international law, cover numerous aspects, uses and consequences of  ICTs, 
as they do with other technologies. In what follows, we first establish the applicability 
of  some of  those duties to ICTs. We then delve deeper into the extent to which these 
duties require states to prevent, halt and redress online harms.
3 The Applicability of  Existing Protective Obligations in 
Cyberspace
As a preliminary point, the applicability of  existing protective obligations to cyber-
space might be challenged on two principal legal bases. First, one may query whether 
41 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 14, at 31–34, citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1987) 14, para. 157 (finding 
that the United States was responsible for actively supporting the Contras, thus breaching its duty to ab-
stain from such support, whereas Nicaragua was responsible for tolerating arms traffic, thus breaching 
its due diligence duty to protect).
42 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 159, Commentary to art. 8, para. 2; 169, Commentary 
to art. 11, para. 1.
43 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee (HRComm), General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, §§ 25, 
28–30; European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), Guide on Article 2 of  the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Right to Life, updated on 31 December 2019, para. 101.
44 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, arts 57–58 (Additional 
Protocol I); International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Database, Rule 15, avail-
able at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15.
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certain international obligations conceived for the ‘offline’ world equally apply to 
cyberspace, as a new ‘domain’ or technology.46 Secondly, it could be argued that states 
have, in their practice and expressions of  opinio juris, actively carved out cyberspace 
from the scope of  application of  said duties.
In addressing those possible objections, it is important to note that several states 
and international institutions have consistently affirmed the application of  inter-
national law as a whole to cyberspace, including, in particular, rules and principles 
that flow from sovereignty.47 And this is because rules of  general international law 
apply, by default and across the board, to all areas and types of  state activity. This is 
so to the extent that the activities in question fall within the scope of  those rules and 
exceptions or more specific rules do not displace them.48 For this reason, several states 
46 See, mutatis mutandis, Corn and Taylor, ‘Sovereignty in the Age of  Cyber’, 111 American Journal of  
International Law (2017) 207, at 208 (challenging on a similar basis the applicability of  a rule of  sover-
eignty to cyberspace). See also Note from Mr. Gabriel Juárez Lucas, Fourth Vice Minister of  the Interior 
Ministry of  the Republic of  Guatemala to Luis Toro Utillano, Technical Secretariat, Inter-American 
Juridical Committee, 4VM.200–2019/GJL/lr/bm, 14 June 2019, cited in Organization of  American 
States (OAS), Improving Transparency – International Law and State Cyber Operations: Fourth Report 
(Presented by Prof. Duncan B. Hollis), OEA/Ser.Q, CJI/doc. 603/20 rev.1, 5 March 2020, § 21 (herein-
after ‘Improving Transparency’) (expressing support for the application of  international law to cyber-
space but noting that there could be areas where ‘the novelty of  cyberspace does preclude the application 
of  certain international rights or obligations’).
47 See, e.g., Report of  the Group of  Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of  Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of  International Security, UN Doc. A/68/98, 24 June 2013, § 19 
(hereinafter ‘UN GGE Report 2013’); UN GGE Report 2015, supra note 5, §§ 24–28; Hon. Paul C. Ney, 
Jr, US Department of  Defense, General Counsel Remarks at US Cyber Command Legal Conference (2 
March 2020), available at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-gen-
eral-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference; US Government, International Strategy 
for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (May 2011), at 9, available 
at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_
cyberspace.pdf  (hereinafter ‘International Strategy for Cyberspace’); Australian Department of  Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘Australia Non Paper: Case Studies on the Application of  International Law 
in Cyberspace’ (2020), at 4, 7–11, available at www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias-oewg-non-
paper-case-studies-on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace.pdf  (hereinafter ‘Australia 
Non Paper’); Jeremy Wright QC MP, UK Attorney General, Speech, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 
21st Century’ (2018), at 3–6, available at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-
law-in-the-21st-century; Ministère de la Defense (France), ‘Droit international appliqué aux opérations 
dans le cyberespace’, at 6–17, available at www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/565895/9750877/
file/Droit+internat+appliqué+aux+opérations+Cyberespace.pdf  (last visited 10 July 2021); Keynote ad-
dress by the Minister of  Defence of  the Kingdom of  the Netherlands, Ms. Ank Bijleveld (20 June 2018), 
available at https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/speeches/2018/06/21/keynote-address-by-the-
minister-of-defence-ms.-ank-bijleveld-marking-the-first-anniversary-of-the-tallinn-manual-2.0-on-
the-20th-of-june-2018. See similarly Comments by Member States on the Initial Pre-Draft of  the OEWG 
Report, available at www.un.org/disarmament/open-ended-working-group/ (see individual comments 
from the Czech Republic, at 2; the Netherlands, §§ 17–18; Japan, at 1, 5; Austria, at 2; Germany, at 2–3). 
See also HRC, Res. 32/13, supra note 28.
48 S.S. Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, para. 45; ILC, Fragmentation of  International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of  International Law, Report of  the Study Group of  the 
International Law Commission Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, § 
120 (hereinafter ‘Fragmentation Report’). See also Akande, Coco and de Souza Dias, ‘Old Habits Die Hard: 
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have stressed that rules of  international law are technology-neutral, even if  questions 
remain as to how they apply to new means of  communication.49 After all, as a means 
to a variety of  ends, ICTs cannot be severed from the activities to which they serve and, 
consequently, from the rules governing them.
Two key rules deriving from the principle of  sovereignty and applying generally in 
international law are precisely the Corfu Channel and the no-harm principles. Thus, 
the presumption we ought to proceed from is that they apply to ICTs, in the absence of  
leges speciales to the contrary.50 In the same vein, the scope of  application of  IHRL and 
IHL is broad, only limited by their respective triggers and subject matter.51 This means 
that, by default, positive duties established in both regimes apply to cyberspace, in the 
absence of  specific carve-outs excluding ICTs from their scope of  application. There is 
no evidence of  such an exception, and admissible derogations from such obligations 
must be interpreted restrictively, due to their erga omnes character.52
On the contrary, states have not only invoked general  international law, IHRL and 
IHL but also supported the applicability of  different protective obligations in cyberspace, 
even if  in a somewhat fragmented way. For instance, as far back as 2011, the then United 
States (US) government recognized the application of  positive IHRL duties online as well 
as a duty to prevent cybercrime.53 Shortly thereafter, the Council of  Europe issued a rec-
ommendation recognizing the applicability of  the no-harm principle to malicious cyber 
activities.54 The Explanatory Memorandum adds that this principle
sets forth a standard of  care or due diligence for the protection and promotion of  integrity and 
universality of  the Internet . . . . Under such a standard, states are required to take reasonable 
measures to prevent, manage and respond to significant transboundary disruptions to or inter-
ferences with the infrastructure or critical resources of  the Internet.55
49 OEWG, Second ‘Pre-Draft’ Report on Developments in the Field of  Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of  International Security (2020), § 21, available at www.un.org/disarmament/open-
ended-working-group/. See also Moynihan, ‘The Application of  International Law to State Cyberattacks 
Sovereignty and Non-Intervention’, Chatham House Research Paper, December 2019, paras 5–6. See 
also Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 31, para. 4; 46, para. 12; Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 39; ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 154, 
Commentary to Draft Article 3, para. 11; Responsibilities and Obligations of  States with Respect to Activities 
in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports (2011) 10, para. 117; Sullivan, supra 
note 3, at 452; Geiss and Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away 
from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’, 
in K. Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, International 
Relations and Diplomacy (2013) 621, at 655.
50 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 31, para. 4; Okwori, ‘The Obligation of  Due Diligence and Cyber-Attacks: 
Bridging the Gap Between Universal and Differential Approaches for States’, Ethiopian Yearbook of  International 
Law (2018) 205, at 213; Khanna, ‘State Sovereignty and Self-Defence in Cyberspace’, 5 BRICS Law Journal 
(2018) 139, at 141. See, generally, Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 39.
51 Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 86.
52 ILC, Fragmentation Report, supra note 48, § 109.
53 International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 47, at 10.
54 Council of  Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)8 of  the Committee of  Ministers to member states on 
the protection and promotion of  the universality, integrity and openness of  the Internet (21 September 
2011), available at https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cc2f8.
55 Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Recommendation CM/Rec(2011) of  the Committee of  Ministers 
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Along with’the a’ovementioned statement by the EU representative in the context of  
the COVID-19 crisis – which was expressly supported by Turkey, North Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia56 – several states have recently recognized 
slightly different iterations of  ‘cyber due diligence’ as a matter of  international law. 
For instance, mirroring the Corfu Channel dictum and rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual, 
France has recently stated that:
In accordance with the principle of  due diligence, States have the obligation to not know-
ingly allow their territory to be used to commit acts prohibited by international law against third 
States through the use of  cyber means. This obligation also applies to activities conducted in 
cyberspace by non-state actors situated in the territory or under the jurisdiction of  the State 
in question.57
Similarly, Estonia has expressed the view that ‘states have to make reasonable efforts 
to ensure that their territory is not used to adversely affect the rights of  other states’.58
Using different wording, Australia has pointed out that ‘to the extent that a state 
enjoys the right to exercise sovereignty over objects and activities within its territory, it 
necessarily shoulders corresponding responsibilities to ensure those objects and activ-
ities are not used to harm other states’.59 More eloquently, Finland has stated that ‘[i]t 
is clear that States have an obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used 
for activities that cause serious harm to other States, whether using ICTs or otherwise’.60 
CM Documents, CM(2011)115-add1, 24 August 2011, § 80 and more extensively §§ 71–84, available 
at https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805ccaeb. See also Interim 
Report of  the Ad-Hoc Advisory Group on Cross-Border Internet to the Steering Committee on the Media 
and New Communication Services incorporating analysis of  proposals for international and multi-stake-
holder cooperation on cross-border Internet, Strasbourg, December 2010, §§ 59–74, esp. §§ 72–74 (on 
the standard of  due diligence), available at http://humanrightseurope.blogspot.com/2011/01/propos-
als-for-international-cooperation.html.
56 See Council of  the EU, Press Release, supra note 2.
57 Comments by Member States on the initial predraft of  the OEWG report, supra note 47, France, at 3 (em-
phasis added). Cf. Anne Gueguen, French Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, Statement at the 
UNSC Arria-Formula Meeting on Cybersecurity (2020), at 1:35:15 min, available at https://youtu.be/
K704P5D1n3E; Ministère de la Defense (France), supra note 47, at 10. Cf. Developments in the Field of  
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of  International Security: Report of  the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/74/120, 24 June 2019, at 24 (reply by France); Stratégie internationale de la France 
pour le numérique (2017), at 32, available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/strategie_numerique_
a4_02_interactif_cle445a6a.pdf.
58 President of  the Republic [of  Estonia] at the opening of  CyCon 2019 (29 May 2019), available at 
www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-
cycon-2019/index.html (emphasis added).
59 Australia Non Paper, supra note 47, at 8 (emphasis added). See also Australia, DFAT, Australia’s 
International Cyber Engagement Strategy, at 90, Annex A: Australia’s position on how international law 
applies to state conduct in cyberspace (2019), available at https://www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/
about/2017-International-Cyber-Engagement-Strategy.
60 Janne Taalas, Ambassador, Statement at the second session of  the open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 
on developments in the field of  information and telecommunications in the context of  international se-
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It has also recognized that ‘each State has to protect individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction from interference with their rights by third parties’.61 
And, in what seems to combine different rules, The Netherlands have posited that:
The principle is articulated by the International Court of  Justice, for example, in its judgment in 
the Corfu Channel Case, in which it held that states have an obligation to act if  they are aware 
or become aware that their territory is being used for acts contrary to the rights of  another state.  
… It is generally accepted that the due diligence principle applies only if  the state whose right or 
rights have been violated suffers sufficiently serious adverse consequences.62
Similar statements have been made by the Czech Republic,63 the Republic of  Korea,64 
Japan,65 Austria,66 the Dominican Republic,67 Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana 
and Peru.68 Taken together, they overshadow the contrary statements made so far 
by Argentina, Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which either reject or 
question the applicability of  due diligence duties to ICTs.69 Most importantly, they 
strongly support the view that existing protective obligations containing a due dili-
gence standard are fully applicable to ICTs, even if  their specific implementation re-
quires additional guidance.
That said, two important questions remain open: (i) whether an all-encompassing 
‘principle of  due diligence’ exists generally in international law; and (ii) whether a 
single protective obligation – with a corresponding due diligence standard – exists 
specifically for cyberspace.70 In particular, some have suggested that rule 6 of  the 
Tallinn Manual and similar cyber-articulations of  the concept of  due diligence are 
lex ferenda71 or mere interpretations of  how an existing, wide-ranging ‘due diligence 
61 Ibid.
62 Government of  the Netherlands, Letter from the Minister of  Foreign Affairs to the President of  the 
House of  Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace (5 July 2019), Appendix: 
International law in cyberspace at 4–5, available at www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-
documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace 
(hereinafter ‘Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019’) (emphases added).
63 Czech Republic, supra note 47, at 3.
64 Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Republic of  Korea, supra note 
47, at 2.
65 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan, Basic Position of  the Government of  Japan on International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (28 May 2021), available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
page3e_001114.html, at 5.
66 Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Austria, supra note 47, at 2–5.
67 H.E. Mr. José Singer Weisinger, Dominican Republic’s Ambassador and Special Envoy to the Security 
Council, Statement (22 May 2020), available at https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/22-5-
2020_cyber_stability_and_conflict_prevention_-3.pdf.
68 OAS, Improving Transparency, supra note 46, § 58. See also ibid., §§ 56ff.
69 Supra note 8.
70 See, e.g., The Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, at 4 (acknowledging that ‘it 
should be noted that not all countries agree that the due diligence principle constitutes an obligation in its 
own right under international law. The Netherlands, however, does regard the principle as an obligation 
in its own right, the violation of  which may constitute an internationally wrongful act’).
71 See Schmitt, ‘“Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of  International 
Law’, 19 Chicago Journal of  International Law (2018) 30, at 51. See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 
32, para. 6; International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 47, at 10 (listing ‘Cybersecurity Due Diligence’ 
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obligation’ should apply to cyberspace.72 They have pointed to several reasons of  pol-
icy behind states’ reluctance to commit to a new rule. For instance, states may fear 
that a fine-grained due diligence standard for cyberspace would be too burdensome 
to implement and could stifle its necessary flexibility.73 Alternatively, such a new obli-
gation may put in question the applicability and binding character of  existing ones.74 
It is also possible that, by widening the scope of  unlawful acts in cyberspace, a new 
protective ‘cyber due diligence’ obligation could increase resort to countermeasures 
and litigiousness among states.75
Perhaps the choice of  using ‘due diligence’ to label a range of  duties is misleading: 
its simplicity masks the complexity and diversity of  protective obligations requiring 
diligent behaviour to prevent, halt and redress certain harms. Part of  the confusion 
also seems to arise from the framing of  ICTs as a new space or ‘domain’, rather than 
a new set of  information and communication tools.76 Nevertheless, the important 
takeaway is this: the uncertainty surrounding a general principle or a cyber-specific 
version of  due diligence does not mean that cyberspace is a ‘duty-free zone’. For, how-
ever we label it, an existing patchwork of  primary ‘protective obligations’ already re-
quires states to behave diligently in preventing, halting and redressing different types 
of  harmful cyber operations.
4 Four Sets of  Protective Obligations in Cyberspace
A The Corfu Channel Principle: A Duty to Prevent Cyber Acts 
Contrary to the Rights of  Other States
The first protective obligation whose applicability in cyberspace has found support 
among states77 and commentators78 is the ‘well-recognized’ Corfu Channel principle, 
72 See, e.g., Milanovic and Schmitt, ‘Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)information Operations during a 
Pandemic’, 11 Journal of  National Security Law & Policy (2020) 247, at 280 (arguing that ‘[t]his obli-
gation is simply the cyber application of  a wide-ranging due diligence positive obligation under general 
international law requiring a state to stop harm to the rights of  other states emanating from its territory’, 
(emphasis added)); Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report, supra note 
47, France (at 1–2); Czech Republic (at 3).
73 Jensen and Watts, supra note 8, at 1574; Adamson, supra note 8, at 55, § 12.
74 Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report, supra note 47, Austria (at 2); 
Australia (at 2–3, item C2).
75 Jensen and Watts, supra note 8, at 1573–1574.
76 See Akande, Coco, and de Souza Dias, supra note 48.
77 See supra notes 54–68.
78 See, e.g., Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 35–36, para. 21; Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 72, 
at 280; Schmitt, ‘In Defense of  Due Diligence in Cyberspace’, 125 Yale Law Journal Forum (2015) 68; 
Bannelier-Christakis, ‘Cyber Diligence: A Low-Intensity Due Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber 
Operations?’, 14 Baltic Yearbook of  International Law (2014) 23, at 25–26; Kulesza, ‘Due Diligence in 
International Internet Law’, Journal of  Internet Law (2014) 24, at 27–28; Geiss and Lahmann, supra 
note 49, at 635; Gross, ‘Cyber Responsibility to Protect: Legal Obligations of  States Directly Affected 
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requiring states ‘not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to 
the rights of  other States’.79 This duty is a natural corollary of  states’ sovereign rights 
over their territory and, in essence, requires them to protect the rights of  other states 
therein.80 The obligation covers not only acts that directly violate the rights of  third 
states, including their rights to territory and property, but also those of  their nationals, 
even when abroad.81 It comprises a duty to both prevent and stop the harmful acts in 
question82 and arises as soon as a state knows or should have known83 that such act 
originates from or transits through its territory.84 Though in essence a preventive duty, 
the obligation is only breached when the harm materializes.85 In a sense, this makes it 
an obligation without sanction for non-compliance, unless actual harm occurs. Often 
seen as a shortcoming, this norm structure may be explained by the need to encourage 
states to continuously prevent harm before their responsibility can be engaged.
Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual seems to contemplate a cyber-specific articulation of  
the Corfu Channel principle.86 This formulation – which has been picked up by some 
states87 – has four noteworthy features: the type of  harm envisaged (Section 4.A.1); 
the threshold of  harm (Section 4.A.2); the scope of  preventive duties (Section 4.A.3); 
and the knowledge requirement (Section 4.A.4).
1 Type of Harm
The Commentary to Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual posits that an act which ‘affects 
the rights of  other states’ should be understood as an internationally wrongful act.88 
‘Cyber-Security Beyond the Military Perspective: International Law, “Cyberspace”, and the Concept of  
Due Diligence’, 58 GYIL (2015) 51, at 61–62; Walter, ‘Obligations of  States Before, During, and After 
a Cyber Security Incident’, 58 GYIL (2015), 67, at 73–76; Dörr, ‘Obligations of  the State of  Origin of  a 
Cyber Security Incident’, 58 GYIL (2015), 87, at 91–92; Jensen and Watts, supra note 8, at 1565–1566.
79 Corfu Channel, Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), at 22 (emphasis added).
80 Island of  Palmas, Award, 4 April 1928, II RIAA 829 (1928), ICGJ 392 (PCA 1928), at 839. See also 
Australia Non Paper, supra note 47, at 8.
81 Island of  Palmas, Award, 4 April 1928, II RIAA 829 (1928), ICGJ 392 (PCA 1928), at 839; Affaire des 
biens britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Spain v United Kingdom), 2 RIAA (1925) 615, at 643–644.
82 See, mutatis mutandis, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff  in Tehran (United States 
of  America v. Iran), Judgment, 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980) 3, paras 63, 68.
83 Corfu Channel, Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), at 18. On the requirement of  knowledge as 
applied to cyberspace, see Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 40–41.
84 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Judgment, 27 June 
1986, ICJ Reports (1987) 14, para. 157.
85 See ARSIWA, supra note 20, art. 14(3). See also Case Concerning Application of  the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v.  Yugoslavia), Judgment, 26 
February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, at 43, para. 431 (hereinafter ‘Bosnian Genocide’); Bannelier-Christakis, 
supra note 78, at 37. See contra Antonopoulos, ‘State Responsibility in Cyberspace’, in N. Tsagourias and 
R. Buchan (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 55, at 69.
86 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 30.
87 See, e.g., Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: France, supra note 47, 
at 3; The Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, at 4.
88 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 34, Commentary to Rule 6, para. 17. See also Johanna Weaver, Submission 
of  Australia’s independent expert to the United Nations Group of  Governmental Experts on advancing re-
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It also notes that this ought to include not only breaches of  international law attrib-
utable to States, but also conduct that would have been unlawful if committed by the 
‘host’ state, no matter its source.89 But while the Corfu Channel dictum recognizes 
state responsibility for lack of  diligence in preventing or stopping acts of  non-state 
actors regardless of  attribution,90 no reference is made to either acts merely affecting 
the rights of  other states or fully fledged internationally wrongful acts, i.e. breaches of  
international law”attributable to a state. Instead, the language used in Corfu Channel 
is that of  ‘acts contrary to the rights of  other states’.91 In our view, this language does 
not fully mirror the two concepts featuring in Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual 2.0 but 
perhaps sits in between them.
Although most acts contrary to the rights of  other states are internationally 
wrongful acts, the overlap is not complete. First, not all acts committed by non-state 
groups which are contrary to the rights of  other states also constitute internation-
ally wrongful acts or would have done so if  committed by the territorial state.92 The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 also does not clarify whether, in speculating if  the conduct would 
have been unlawful if  committed by the host state, one must consid”r the concrete cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time or the obligations of  the host state in abstracto.93 
A  second difference may concern acts that are not unlawful given the existence of  
circumstances precluding wrongfulness but that would still entitle the ‘victim’ state to 
claim compensation for a material loss.94
Thus, the framing of  the type of  harm covered by the Corfu Channel principle as 
‘internationally wrongful acts’ is not entirely accurate. And neither is its qualification 
as ‘acts that affect the rights of  other states’. This is because not all acts merely affecting 
the rights of  third states – such as certain instances of  cyber espionage95 – necessarily 
contravene their rights. Furthermore, acts covered by the Corfu Channel principle need 
not result in physical damage.96 This is particularly important in cyberspace, where 
many harms have no direct material impact yet may hamper the operation of  govern-
mental or private functions, such as disruptions of  financial or media services.97
www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/submission-by-australias-representative-to-the-gge-norm-implementa-
tion-may-2020.pdf; The Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, at 4; Okwori, supra 
note 50, at 219–220; Sander, ‘Democracy Under The Influence: Paradigms of  State Responsibility for Cyber 
Influence Operations on Elections’, 18 Chinese Journal of  International Law (2019) 1, at 25–26; Milanovic and 
Schmitt, supra note 72, at 280.
89 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 35–36, para. 21.
90 See Affaire des biens britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Spain v. United Kingdom), 2 RIAA (1925) 615, at 643–
644; Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 2; Dörr, supra note 78, at 90; Kolb, supra note 37, at 119.
91 Corfu Channel, Judgment, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), at 22.
92 For instance, during a cross-border non-international armed conflict, the targeting of  foreign enemy 
combatants by a non-state group is contrary to the rights of  the foreign state to protect their nationals, 
yet this may not amount to an internationally wrongful act if  committed by the host state itself.
93 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 35–36, paras 18–22.
94 ARSIWA, supra note 20, art. 27.
95 See Section 4.A.2.
96 Kolb, supra note 37, at 121; The Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, at 5.
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An example of  cyber activities ‘contrary to the rights of  other States’ may be found 
in the United Kingdom’s recent condemnation of  ‘irresponsible activity being carried 
out by criminal groups’ and ‘cyberattacks by States and non-States actors’ during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.98 The acts in question consisted of  ‘malicious cyber campaigns 
targeting international healthcare and medical research organizations involved in the 
coronavirus response’, which were clearly contrary to the rights of  targeted states, 
regardless of  any material harm caused.
2 Threshold of Harm?
Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual is said to be engaged only if  an internationally wrongful 
act has ‘serious adverse consequences’ for other states.99 This threshold of  harm is 
not found in pre-existing iterations of  the Corfu Channel principle. Instead, it seems 
to have been borrowed from the no-harm principle,100 which requires significant 
transboundary harm but not necessarily an act contrary to the rights of  other states. 
Like much of  the existing literature on due diligence,101 the Manual seems to have 
merged the two principles into one single rule or principle requiring due diligence in 
cyberspace.102
However, that is not to say that a failure to prevent or halt any cyber harm, regard-
less of  its gravity, amounts to a breach of  the Corfu Channel principle. States are not 
responsible for failing to avoid minor or negligible disruptions, such as the temporary 
defacement of  non-essential government websites. But this is not because the principle 
contains a specific harm threshold. Rather, it is because those harms may not be con-
trary to the rights of  other states.103 For instance, in many circumstances, mere exfil-
tration or corruption of  data – according to some – may not be contrary to the victim 
state’s sovereign rights over its territory104 or its right not to be subjected to foreign 
98 Press Release, ‘UK Condemns Cyber Actors Seeking to Benefit from Global Coronavirus Pandemic’ (5 
May 2020), available at www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-cyber-actors-seeking-to-benefit- 
from-global-coronavirus-pandemic.
99 Ibid., at 36–37, paras 25–27; 39, para. 33. See also Okwori, supra note 50, at 218–219; Milanovic and 
Schmitt, supra note 72, at 279. See also The Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, 
at 5; Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Canada, supra note 47, 
at 3.
100 Schmitt, supra note 71, at 54.
101 See, e.g., Couzigou, ‘Securing Cyber Space: The Obligation of  States to Prevent Harmful International 
Cyber Operations’, 32 International Review of  Law, Computers & Technology (2018) 37; Okwori, supra 
note 50, at 208–213; Geiss and Lahmann, supra note 49, at 635; Gross, supra note 78, at 494; Ney and 
Zimmermann, supra note 78, at 61–62; Walter, supra note 78, at 73–76; Dörr, supra note 78, at 91–92; 
Brunée and Meshel, supra note 21, at 133–135; Jensen and Watts, supra note 8, at 1565–1566.
102 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 30–32, paras 1–5. See also Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 7274, 
at 280.
103 Walton, ‘Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary Torts in International 
Law’, 126 Yale Law Journal (2016) 1460, at 1502; Crootof, ‘International Cybertorts: Expanding State 
Accountability in Cyberspace’, 103 Cornell Law Review (2018) 565, at 565–567, 597–599, 606–607.
104 See Corn and Taylor, supra note 46, at 209–210. But see Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 18–19 
and 171, para. 10 (noting that although most acts of  cyber espionage are lawful, they may constitute a 
breach of  sovereignty if  physically conducted on the territory of  the victim state and attributable to an-
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intervention.105 Conversely, lack of  due diligence in preventing or stopping malicious 
cyber operations that interfere with a state’s inherently sovereign functions or domaine 
reservé, such as its ability to establish public health policies or to hold elections, might 
breach the Corfu Channel principle. And this includes acts occurring entirely within 
the duty-bearer’s territory, as the Corfu Channel principle does not require the phys-
ical crossing of  a territorial boundary.106
3 Scope of  Preventive Duties
Drawing on the duty to prevent genocide, the group of  experts involved in Tallinn 
2.0 rejected the view that states have a ‘general duty of  prevention’, that is, a duty 
to prevent future malicious cyber operations.107 For the Tallinn 2.0 experts, the Corfu 
Channel principle only applies to ongoing, or at most imminent, operations, at least as 
far as cyberspace is concerned.108 This would limit the scope of  the duty to an obliga-
tion to simply halt harmful cyber operations.109 As a consequence, when discharging 
this duty, states would not be required to adopt strictly preventive, ex ante measures, 
such as continuous supervision or monitoring of  their networks.110
This view has been justified by the current lack of  technical feasibility to prevent 
online harms, given their frequency and speed, as well as privacy concerns.111 But this 
misses the point. Protective obligations, including the Corfu Channel principle, are 
inherently flexible. They depend on the capacity and position of  each state to prevent 
or halt the harm in question, whether the cyber operation originates from or transits 
through its territory.112 Thus, a state is not required to do the impossible, and different 
states may be required to adopt different measures in different circumstances. State 
practice in this respect reveals that a range of  measures has been adopted to prevent 
105 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 36, para. 23.
106 This position seems to have been implicitly endorsed in Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 39, para. 32.
107 Ibid., at 31, para. 5; 41–42, para. 42; 44–45, paras 7, 10.
108 Ibid., at 43–44, paras 3–4. See also Okwori, supra note 50, at 216.
109 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 44–45, para. 7.
110 Ibid., at 44–45, paras 7, 10; Couzigou, supra note 101, at 50–51; Okwori, supra note 50, at 215; Jensen 
and Watts, supra note 8, at 1566; Takano, ‘Due Diligence Obligations and Transboundary Environmental 
Harm: Cybersecurity Applications’, 36 Laws (2018) 7, at 8. See also ILA Study, supra note 14, at 7–8; 
Estonia, supra note 58; Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Canada, 
supra note 47, at 3; Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Ecuador, 
supra note 47, at 2.
111 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 45, para. 8. See also Okwori, supra note 50, at 215; Crootof, supra 
note 103, at 611, Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View – Future Challenges Essay (2011), 
at 9–10, available at https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/futurechallenges_gold-
smith.pdf.
112 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 47, paras 16–18; Buchan, supra note 1, at 441–442; Bannelier-
Christakis, supra note 78, at 37; Dörr, supra note 78, at 95. See also Ecuador, supra note 47, at 2; The 
Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, at 5; Australia Non Paper, supra note 47, 
at 8; Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Canada, supra note 47, at 
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harmful cyber operations. These have included cyber-threat monitoring113 and the is-
suance of  alerts and advisories to address software or hardware vulnerabilities.114
Yet such flexibility is no excuse for inaction. A logical prerequisite to protective obli-
gations of  conduct is a separate obligation to put in place the minimum governmental 
infrastructure that is reasonable in the circumstances, enabling a state to exercise the 
necessary degree of  diligence.115 This is likely an obligation of  result, i.e. a baseline gov-
ernmental infrastructure must be established.116 Indeed, if  a state could simply claim 
that it has exercised its best efforts for this purpose, the main duty to prevent harm 
could be easily evaded. However, the content of  such capacity-building obligation – 
the result required from each state – does not seem to be fixed, but dependent on the 
circumstances, in particular, available human and financial resources.
Thus, the Corfu Channel principle contains two distinct but interconnected 
limbs.117 First, there is an obligation to set up a minimal state apparatus – a core 
‘capacity-building’ duty. Recent state practice in the cyber context indicates that such 
duty would include the adoption and implementation of  an adequate national legal 
framework tackling cybercrime and misuse of  ICTs.118 Secondly, there is an obligation 
of  conduct to exercise due diligence to prevent and halt potential or actual cyber oper-
ations contrary to the rights of  other states, to the extent of  a state’s capacity to act 
in the circumstances. Thus, a state’s capacity to act not only triggers its obligation of  
conduct but also limits and modulates the measures it is required to adopt. However, 
as with other protective duties, required measures may change on the basis of  new 
technological developments.119 For instance, if  a state has or acquires cyber moni-
toring technologies enabling it to anticipate and prevent certain malicious cyber op-
erations, these must be used as far as possible.120 While these technologies may raise 
concerns about privacy and other rights, it suffices to note that the implementation of  
113 See, e.g., Cybersecurity Law (promulgated by the Standing Committee of  the National People’s Congress, 
7 November 2016, effective 1 June 2017), arts. 21(3), 51 (China); UK Network and Information Systems 
Regulations 2018, 10 May 2018, Part II, s.  5(2)(a); Japan Cybersecurity Strategy  (27 July 2018), at 
27–29, 31, 35.
114 See, e.g., US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Alert: Technical Approaches to Uncovering 
and Remediating Malicious Activity, AA20-245A (1 September 2020), available at https://us-cert.cisa.
gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a; Canada’s Implementation of  the 2015 GGE Norms, at 5, available at www.
un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/canada-implementation-2015-gge-norms-nov-
16-en.pdf  (last visited 17 July 2021).
115 See Buchan, supra note 1, at 436–437; Kolb, supra note 37, at 127, Couzigou, supra note 101, at 50–51; 
Takano, supra note 110, at 9. On the no-harm principle, see ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 
21, at 155, Commentary to art. 3, paras 15–17.
116 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 14, at 26; Buchan, supra note 1, at 434–439.
117 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 14, at 26–27.
118 See, e.g. International Cyber Engagement Strategy, Annex B: Australian Implementation of  Norms of  
Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace (2019), sub (c), available at https://www.internationalcy-
bertech.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-12/how-australia-implements-the-ungge-norms.pdf; Canada’s 
Implementation of  the 2015 GGE Norms, supra note 114, at 4–5.
119 See supra note 49.
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due diligence measures under the Corfu Channel principle must be in line with inter-
national human rights law and other rules of  international law.121
4 Knowledge Requirement
In any event, the obligation to act in accordance with the Corfu Channel principle is 
only activated when a state knows, or should have known, about a serious risk that an 
unlawful cyber operation will take place, no matter how remote such a risk is.122 Thus, 
the decisive factor is how much information and certainty a state possesses about the 
harmful act in question, rather than how imminent or proximate it is.123 The same ap-
plies to transit states, to the extent that they have actual or constructive knowledge of  
the risk of  an unlawful cyber operation, as well as the capacity to prevent it.124
At the same time, it does not appear that the Corfu Channel principle imposes on 
states a duty to actively seek knowledge of  acts emanating from or transiting through 
their territory which would be contrary to the rights of  other states.125 What it does 
require is the minimum governmental infrastructure or capacity enabling states to ac-
quire such knowledge.126 Yet it has been suggested that the knowledge requirement 
may be proven by a (rebuttable) presumption when an unlawful cyber operation 
originates in non-commercial cyber infrastructure under a state’s exclusive govern-
mental control.127 This could prevent states from easily evading their protective obli-
gations by denying knowledge of  a certain unlawful cyber operation.
In short, ‘the more states can do, the more they must do’,128 and great responsi-
bility follows inseparably from great power,129 to the extent that such power permits. 
Therefore, complying with the Corfu Channel principle in cyberspace should not be 
an insurmountable feat: it simply requires states to build the minimum capacity that 
is reasonably expected of  them, as well as to employ this capacity diligently in trying 
to protect the rights of  other states, as far as possible.130 In many circumstances, re-
porting and sharing information about cyber incidents will suffice.131
121 See Bannelier-Christakis, supra note 78, at 31; Dörr, supra note 78, at 95.
122 See Kolb, supra note 37, at 123–124; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 45, para. 9 and ibid., at 44–45, 
para. 7, citing Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, supra note 85, para. 431.
123 See, mutatis mutandis, Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 436.
124 Similarly, see Couzigou, supra note 101, at 43, 47; Buchan, supra note 1, at 441. See contra Reinisch and 
Beham, supra note 11, at 106–107; Okwori, supra note 50, at 226–227.
125 But international human rights law might impose a duty to actively seek knowledge of  certain threats to 
human rights. See Section 3.C.
126 See supra note 115.
127 Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Legal Implications of  Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace’, in C.  Czosseck, 
R. Ottis and K. Ziolkowski (eds), 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (2012) 7, at 17.
128 Heieck, Symposium: A Duty to Prevent Genocide – Due Diligence Obligations among the P5 (Part One) (2018), 
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/12/10/symposium-a-duty-to-prevent-genocide-due-diligence-
obligations-among-the-p5-part-one/ (emphasis added).
129 Collection générale des décrets rendus par la Convention Nationale: Mois de mai 1793 (1793), at 72. The adage 
has been popularized by the Spiderman comic books.
130 See, similarly, Kolb, supra note 37, at 123.
131 Gross, supra note 78, at 506. See also Secretariat Général de la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale (France), 
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B The Duty to Prevent and Redress Significant Transboundary 
Cyber Harm
Despite their similarities, particularly a common ‘capacity-to-act’ requirement, the 
no-harm and Corfu Channel principles should be distinguished, given their distinct 
elements and legal consequences.132 There are at least four significant differences be-
tween the two primary obligations: i) the type of  harm; ii) the threshold of  harm; iii) 
the knowledge requirement; and iv) the legal consequences of  a failure to comply with 
the duty.
1 Type of Harm
Unlike the Corfu Channel principle, the no-harm principle does not require the inflic-
tion of  an act contrary to the rights of  other states but covers any ‘significant trans-
boundary harm’ or the risk thereof, even if  caused by lawful activities or no state right 
is undermined.133 In ‘cyberspace’ as in more traditional ‘spaces’, such as land, air and 
sea, the crossing of  a border occurs when harm is caused or felt in the territory of  – or 
in other places or infrastructures under the jurisdiction or control of  – a state other 
than the state of  origin.134 This is so to the extent that ICTs remain grounded in phys-
ical spaces or structures and are used or controlled by human beings, even if  certain 
online activities cause primarily non-physical effects.135
While some have questioned whether this obligation applies outside of  the envir-
onmental legal framework, there are strong reasons to suggest that it covers any type 
of  transboundary harm,136 including harm caused through ICTs. In particular, the 
Trail Smelter arbitral tribunal found that the obligation not to cause transboundary 
harm includes any ‘injurious act’ to the territory of  another state, persons or property 
therein.137 In doing so, it looked at precedents dealing not only with environmental 
132 See ILC, Summary Record of  the 1251st Meeting, Topic: State Responsibility, A/CN.4/SR.1251, Extract 
from the Yearbook of  the International Law Commission 1974 vol. 1, available at https://legal.un.org/
ilc/documentation/english/summary_records/a_cn4_sr1251.pdf  (last accessed 17 July 2021), at 
7 (noting that ‘[i]n any case it was essential to make a very clear distinction between responsibility for 
wrongful activities and liability for lawful activities liable to cause damage. In the case of  wrongful activities, 
damage was often an important element, but it was not absolutely necessary as a basis for international re-
sponsibility. On the other hand, damage was an indispensable element for establishing liability for lawful, but 
injurious activities’ (emphasis added). See also Crootof, supra note 103, at 600; Walton, supra note 103, 
at 1486–1487; Sander, supra note 88, at 49.
133 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 150, Commentary to Article 1, para. 6; 152, 
Commentary to art. 2, para. 5.  See also Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 11; Crootof, supra note 103, 
at 600.
134 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 151–153, art. 2(c) and Commentary, paras 8–9.
135 Akande, Coco and de Souza Dias, supra note 48. See also Schmitt, ‘Israel’s Cautious Perspective on 
International Law in Cyberspace: Part I  (Methodology and General International Law’, EJIL: Talk! (17 
December 2020), available at www.ejiltalk.org/israels-cautious-perspective-on-international-law-in-
cyberspace-part-i-methodology-and-general-international-law/.
136 See ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 148–149; Crootof, supra note 103, at 603–604; 
Walton, supra note 103, at 1465, 1479–1481; Sander, supra note 88, at 51.
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hazards but also the use of  weapons and the treatment of  aliens.138 Similarly, ac-
cording to the ICJ, the no-harm principle is a manifestation of  the general principle 
of  prevention and therefore closely relates to the Corfu Channel rule.139 Granted, this 
general finding was made in the context of  a state’s obligation ‘to use all the means 
at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any 
area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of  another 
State’.140 Yet, that the Court specifically highlighted the existence of  this duty, ‘now 
part of  the corpus of  international law relating to the environment’,141 as was relevant 
to that case, by no means exhausts or negates the general applicability of  the no-harm 
principle beyond the environmental realm. In fact, the ILC has clarified that its Draft 
Articles on Prevention of  Transboundary Harm apply to ‘harm caused to persons, 
property or the environment’, which includes ‘detrimental effects on matters such as, 
for example, human health, industry, property, environment or agriculture’.142
For those reasons, many commentators have persuasively expressed the view that 
the no-harm principle applies to a range of  harms committed through ICTs, whether 
or not they are contrary to the rights of  other states.143 Admittedly, many harmful 
cyber  operations will be contrary to at least one rule of  international law and will 
likely be contrary to the rights of  other states. In particular, if  sovereignty is a stan-
dalone rule of  international law, intrusions into governmental networks or systems by 
another state that cause physical or functional harm in another state’s territory may 
breach such rule.144 Likewise, coercive cyber interference with a state’s exclusive gov-
ernmental functions, such as its ballot-counting or national banking systems, would 
violate the principle of  non-intervention.145 And to the extent that those cyber incur-
sions violate the rights of  individuals, such as their right to free elections, privacy or 
property, they would likely violate international human rights law.146 This should be 
138 Ibid., at 1963–1965.
139 Pulp Mills, Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), para. 101.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., citing Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 29.
142 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, art. 2, at 153, para. 8; Commentary, at 152, para. 4 
(emphasis added). See also Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/373 and Corr.1&.2 (27 June 1983), para. 17 (clarifying that ‘there was never an intention to pro-
pose a reduction in the scope of  the topic to questions of  an ecological nature’).
143 See, e.g., Crootof, supra note 103, at 603–604; Walton, supra note 103, at 1480–1482, 1497; Sander, 
supra note 88, a 49–50; Reinisch and Beham, supra note 11, at 104–106; Dörr, supra note 78, at 93; 
Buchan, supra note 1, at 439–452; Okwori, supra note 50, at 210; Takano, supra note 110. See also 
Interim Report of  the Ad-Hoc Advisory Group on Cross-Border Internet, supra note 55, paras 60–65.
144 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 19–22; Schmitt and Vihul, ‘Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace’, 95 
Texas Law Review (2017) 1639, at 1648–1649. Granted, controversies as to the existence and extent of  
such rule may lead to diverging views about the occurrence of  ‘harm’. This does not deny, however, that 
if  such harm may be established the ‘no-harm’ principle would apply.
145 See, e.g., Watts, ‘Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of  Non-Intervention’, in J. D. Ohlin 
et al. (eds), Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (2015) 250, at 257. But see Sander, supra note 
88, at 20.
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true at least for negative human rights obligations,147 for which a state’s jurisdiction 
may be triggered by the exercise of  control over the activity in question,148 the digital 
communications infrastructure149 or the enjoyment of  the victim’s human rights,150 
regardless of  physical proximity between the perpetrator and the victim.
However, no rule of  international law needs to be breached or contravened for the 
no-harm principle to apply.151 This gives the principle a potentially wide scope of  ap-
plication which is particularly well-suited for cyberspace, where debates continue as 
to the nature of  sovereignty, jurisdiction and prohibited intervention.152 It may be the 
only applicable international rule requiring states to prevent, stop and redress cer-
tain low-intensity cyber operations.153 Although the no-harm principle requires the 
crossing of  an international boundary,154 it is not limited to physical harms.155 Often re-
ferred to as ‘international cybertorts’,156 these transboundary operations may include 
substantial financial loss, functional and/or physical damage to private networks or 
systems, data corruption or loss, reputational injuries and political consequences.157
2 Threshold of Harm
At the same time, the no-harm principle is only engaged by significant transboundary 
harm or the risk thereof. In the words of  the ILC: ‘It is to be understood that “sig-
nificant” is something more than “detectable” but need not be at the level of  “serious” or 
“substantial”. The harm must lead to a real detrimental effect on matters such as, 
for example, human health, industry, property, environment or agriculture in other 
States’.158 ‘Significant harm’, in this context, encompasses ‘the combined effect of  the 
147 See M.  Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of  Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 
(2011), at 209; Sander, supra note 88, at 39–43. On extraterritorial jurisdiction over online harms, see 
Section 4.C.1.
148 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v.  Uruguay, HRComm Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, § 12.3; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, HRComm Communication 
No 56/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 29 July 1981, § 10.3.
149 Report of  the Office of  the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014, § 34.
150 HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 63; ECtHR, Issa and Others v.  Turkey, Appl. 
no.  31821/96, Judgment of  16 November 2004, para. 71; ECtHR, Jaloud v.  The Netherlands, Appl. 
no. 47708/08, Judgment of  20 November 2014, para. 152.
151 Walton, supra note 103, at 1486. See also Finland, Statement by Ambassador Janne Taalas, supra note 61, 
at 2.
152 Crootof, supra note 103, at 592–593; Sander, supra note 88, at 18–24, 52.
153 Walton, supra note 103, at 1497–1499, 1512.
154 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 152–153, art. 3(c)–(e) and Commentary, paras 9–12.
155 According to the ILC, the Draft Articles on Prevention were limited to physical harms ‘to bring this topic 
within a manageable scope’. See ibid., at 151; Commentary to art. 1, para. 16; Trail Smelter (United States 
v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1911, at 1926–1927; Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Reports (1996), paras 29 and 36. See also Crootof, supra note 103, at 603; Walton, supra note 103, at 
1482; Buchan, supra note 1, at 449–450; Takano, supra note 110, at 1.
156 See Crootof, supra note 103, at 588–589, 592, 595–597; Walton, supra note 103, at 1513.
157 Crootof, supra note supra note 103, at 608–609; Gross, supra note 78, at 484; Takano, supra note 110, at 
6–7. See also US Department of  Defense Cyber Strategy (2015), at 5, available at https://archive.defense.
gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf.
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probability of  occurrence of  an accident and the magnitude of  its injurious impact’.159 
Thus, it covers activities carrying a ‘low probability of  causing disastrous harm’, as 
well as operations where there is ‘a high probability of  causing significant harm’.160 In 
cyberspace, this could potentially include physical, functional or non-physical harm 
to hardware, software, data or their individual users. Such harms may be caused by 
online mis- and disinformation campaigns, especially those taking place during elec-
tions161 or public health crises,162 as well as the exploitation of  vulnerabilities in widely 
used IT supply chain products.163 The determination of  what amounts to significant 
harm involves a subjective assessment that varies depending on the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, in particular, existing scientific knowledge, the economic value 
of  the activity or good in question and the extent of  the damage caused.164
3 Knowledge Requirement
Both the no-harm and the Corfu Channel principles are triggered by actual or con-
structive knowledge of  a risk and exclude unforeseeable harms.165 However, the no-
harm principle also applies where there is ‘low probability’ of  ‘disastrous harm’.166 
Thus, it may require more proactive measures of  vigilance or monitoring,167 variable 
on the basis of  the seriousness of  the harm.168 Again, a requirement to be continu-
ously vigilant in the use of  ICTs169 – or any other technology for that matter – depends 
on each state’s capacity to act170 and must be consistent with other international ob-
ligations. All in all, the more feasible it is for states to predict that a certain harmful 
159 Ibid., para. 2.
160 Ibid., para. 3.
161 See Sander, supra note 88, at 49–50.
162 See Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 72. See also Robinson and Spring, ‘Coronavirus: How Bad 
Information Goes Viral’, BBC (2020), available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-51931394; 
Rankin, ‘Russian media “spreading Covid-19 disinformation”’, Guardian (2020), available at www.
theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/russian-media-spreading-covid-19-disinformation. See also 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of  Health (Article 12), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, § 34. On due 
diligence obligations applying in relation to COVID-19, see Coco and de Souza Dias, ‘Prevent, Respond, 
Cooperate: States’ Due Diligence Duties vis-à-vis the Covid-19 Pandemic’, 11 Journal of  Humanitarian 
Legal Studies (2020) 218.
163 See, e.g., reports on the widespread impact of  the SolarWinds Hack: Sanger, Perlroth and Barnes, ‘As 
Understanding of  Russian Hacking Grows, So Does Alarm’, New York Times, 2 January 2021, available at 
https://nyti.ms/3hvBUfA.
164 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 153, Commentary to art. 2, para. 7.
165 Ibid., at 153 and 155, Commentary to art. 3, paras 5 and 18.
166 Ibid., at 152, Commentary to art. 2, para. 3.
167 Ibid., at 156, art. 5 and Commentary.
168 Ibid., at 154–155, Commentary to art. 3, paras 11 and 18; ILA Study, supra note 14, at 12; Responsibilities 
and Obligations of  States with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS 
Reports (2011) 10, para. 117; Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 17.
169 In defence of  a duty to continuously monitor cyberspace, see Geiss and Lahmann, supra note 49, at 254–
255, citing Pulp Mills, Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), para. 197; Buchan, supra note 1, at 
441–442; Bannelier-Christakis, supra note 78, at 30–31; Takano, supra note 110, at 7–8.
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cyber operation is forthcoming, the greater the degree of  diligence required. Such 
flexibility, however, must always be assessed against a core component of  the no-harm 
principle, i.e. a state’s duty to ‘keep abreast of  technological changes and scientific 
developments’,171 which suggests a requirement to continuously engage in capacity 
building, to the extent feasible in the circumstances.172
4 Legal Consequences
As seen earlier, the Corfu Channel principle is triggered once a state knows or should 
have known of  the serious risk of  an act contrary to the rights of  other states emanat-
ing from or crossing its territory and is breached when the act in question occurs. It is 
at this point that the responsibility of  the duty-bearer is engaged and other states can 
respond with countermeasures. Conversely, under the no-harm principle, the occur-
rence of  harm or the risk thereof, which a state has failed to prevent or halt, does not 
automatically engage the responsibility of  the duty-bearer. It is only after a state fails 
to compensate the victim for the damage caused that a breach of  the no-harm prin-
ciple arises.173
In this way, the no-harm principle is simultaneously a primary and secondary 
rule of  international law: it requires states to take action and foresees the very con-
sequences arising from a failure to act.174 Those consequences are, first, liability for 
the harm caused, and, secondly, responsibility for the eventual failure to redress it.175 
This norm structure is a logical consequence of  the principle’s emphasis on repar-
ation: states are given an opportunity to redress the harm before their responsibility is 
engaged. It is not the harm itself  or the failure to prevent it that are unlawful,176 but 
the failure to redress it. The advantages of  applying this regime to cyberspace include 
increasing the costs of  harmful cyber operations and deterring them, avoiding the 
stigma and antagonism associated with unlawful acts and fostering victim redress.177 
In the ICT context, given the interconnectivity and interdependence of  different net-
works, international cooperation,178 vulnerability disclosure179 and cyber incident re-
covery plans180 have been highlighted as key measures of  redress.
171 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 154 Commentary to art. 3, para. 11.
172 States seem to be adamant about the need for capacity building. For recent practice, see Canada’s 
Implementation of  the 2015 GGE Norms, supra note 114, at 5; UK Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group on 
Cyber Issues, ‘Efforts to Implement Norms of  Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace, as Agreed in UN 
Group of  Government Expert Reports of  2010, 2013 and 2015’, at 5, available at www.un.org/disarma-
ment/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/efforts-implement-norms-uk-stakeholders-12419.pdf  (last visited 
10 June 2021).
173 See Crootof, supra note 103, at 603; Walton, supra note 103, at 1487–1488; Sander, supra note 88, at 51; 
Dörr, supra note 78, at 96.
174 Walton, supra note 103, at 1486–1487; Sander, supra note 88, at 50.
175 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 148, General Commentary, para. 1; at 150, Commentary 
to art. 1, para. 6. See also Walton, supra note 103, at 1486–1488; Sander, supra note 88, at 51.
176 See ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 154, Commentary to art. 3, para. 7.
177 Crootof, supra note 103, at 597–599, 604–608, 614; Walton, supra note 103, at 1511–1516.
178 Stratégie internationale de la France pour le numérique, at 32, available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/
pdf/strategie_numerique_a4_02_interactif_cle445a6a.pdf  (last visited 10 July 2021).
179 G7, ‘Cyber Norm Initiative: Synthesis of  Lessons Learned and Best Practices’, 26 August 2019, at 3, 
available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/_eng_synthesis_cyber_norm_initiative_cle44136e.pdf.
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C The Obligation to Protect Human Rights Online
The increasing number of  everyday activities which are carried out online has ex-
posed human rights to infinite possibilities of  harm. Just to mention probably the 
most egregious example, the right to privacy is seriously endangered by the constant 
tracking and mining of  online activities and data, as well as their subsequent profiling. 
Likewise, the rights to freedom of  thought, information and expression may be under-
mined by online disinformation campaigns, the proliferation of  fake news or censor-
ship. Cyber-bulling, defamation and hate speech can spread incredibly quickly, with 
detrimental effects on individuals’ rights and reputation.181
International human rights law (IHRL) imposes on states a set of  protective obli-
gations against these harms. They cover online activities to the extent that they take 
place under a state’s jurisdiction.182 In the cyber realm as in any other area of  human 
activity, states not only have a ‘negative’ duty to respect human rights online – i.e. not 
to violate those rights with their own actions. They also have a positive duty to adopt 
all reasonable measures to protect the human rights of  persons under their jurisdic-
tion against threats posed by other entities, be them foreign governments, companies, 
criminals or other actors.183 In addition, states must ensure the effective enjoyment of  
human rights on the Internet.184 Positive obligations to protect and ensure may be po-
tentially identified for all human rights.185 With specific reference to the rights which 
are more commonly endangered online, one may highlight the rights to privacy,186 
honour and reputation,187 and freedom of  information and expression.188
181 ECtHR, Delfi  v. Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, Judgment of  16 June 2015, para. 110.
182 UN GGE Report 2015, supra note 5, § 28(b).
183 ECtHR, Bărbulescu v. Romania, Appl. no. 61496/08, Judgment of  12 January 2016, para. 110, with re-
spect to the right to privacy. In this sense, see also Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 72, at 270ff.
184 Cf. HRComm, General Comment No. 31 [80], The nature of  the general legal obligation imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 8. See also HRComm, 
CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of  States Parties’ Obligations (Article 2(1) of  the Covenant), 
E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, § 1; IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Merits), 29 July 
1988, paras 166–167.
185 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art. 2(1)–(2) (here-
inafter ‘ICCPR’); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3, 
art. 2(1) (hereinafter ‘ICESCR’); American Convention on Human Rights 1978, OAS Treaty Series No. 
36, 1144 UNTS 123, art. 1(1) (hereinafter ‘ACHR’); European Convention for the Protection of  Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1953, 213 UNTS 221, art. 1 (hereinafter ‘ECHR’).
186 ECtHR, X and Y v. the Netherlands, Appl. no. 8978/80, Judgment of  26 March 1985, para. 23; ECtHR, 
Bărbulescu v.  Romania, Appl. no.  61496/08, Judgment of  12 January 2016, para. 108; ECtHR, 
Hämäläinen v. Finland, Appl. no. 37359/09, Judgment of  16 July 2014, para. 62; ECtHR, Nicolae Virgiliu 
Tănase v. Romania, Appl. no. 41720/13, Judgment of  25 June 2019, para. 125. Cf. also HRComm, CCPR 
General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of  Privacy, Family, Home 
and Correspondence, and Protection of  Honour and Reputation, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, 8 April 
1988, § 10.
187 HRComm, General Comment No. 16, supra note 186, §§ 1 and 11. The principles established therein, 
even though not referred to ICTs specifically, are in principle applicable to such technologies as well.
188 HRComm, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of  opinion and expression, UN Doc CCPR/C/






/ejil/article/32/3/771/6356808 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2021
796 EJIL 32 (2021), 771–805 Articles
Due diligence, in this context, designates the standard of  conduct that states must 
meet to comply with the said positive obligations.189 Notably, positive human rights 
duties are owed not only to states but also individuals and the international commu-
nity as a whole. They require states to prevent threats to the enjoyment of  human 
rights, halt harms once they have initiated and remedy their effects, to the extent 
possible.190 Attribution of  the harmful conduct is unnecessary: all that must be dem-
onstrated is that the state failed to adopt the necessary and reasonable protective 
measures, irrespective of  who or what caused the harm.191
Such measures may vary greatly depending on the human right in question, the 
type of  threat and/or harm which the state is trying to prevent and the circumstances 
prevailing at the time. Treaty bodies have adopted relatively open-ended formulas 
when it comes to compliance. For instance, states have been urged to establish an ad-
equate legal framework192 providing for the availability of  civil remedies and criminal 
provisions enabling effective investigations and prosecutions of  rights violations.193 
Such laws should cover, inter alia, the prohibition of  online speech constituting incite-
ment to hatred, discrimination or violence based on certain characteristics, content 
moderation mechanisms, educational campaigns, the prohibition of  Internet shut-
downs and arbitrary content takedowns,194 as well as corporate responsibility, public–
private partnerships and export control of  IT products.195
States’ positive human rights obligations containing a due diligence standard must 
not be confused with the related concept of  corporate ‘human rights due diligence’, 
i.e. the non-binding responsibility of  businesses to mitigate the human rights impact 
of  their activities.196 That said, states themselves have a positive obligation to establish 
189 HRComm, General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, § 8; Besson, supra note 39, at 2, 4–5; Milanovic and 
Schmitt, supra note 72, at 270ff.
190 With respect to civil and political rights, see HRComm, General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, §§ 8, 
17; for economic, social and cultural rights, see, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 24 on State obliga-
tions under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of  busi-
ness activities, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/24, 10 August 2017, § 14.
191 Seibert-Fohr, ‘From Complicity to Due Diligence: When Do States Incur Responsibility for Their 
Involvement in Serious International Wrongdoing?’, 60 GYIL (2017) 667, at 670; Keller and Walther, 
‘Evasion of  the International Law of  State Responsibility? The ECtHR’s Jurisprudence on Positive and 
Preventive Obligations under Article 3’, International Journal of  Human Rights (2019) 1, at 3; HRComm, 
General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, § 8.
192 Bărbulescu v. Romania, Appl. no. 61496/08, Judgment of  12 January 2016, paras 115–116; HRComm, 
General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, §§ 7, 13; HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, 
§§ 4, 13, 22.
193 ECtHR, Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania, Appl. no. 41720/13, Judgment of  25 June 2019, para. 127; 
HRComm, General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, §§ 8, 18; HRComm, General Comment No. 36, 
supra note 43, §§ 13, 19, 27–28.
194 Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  the Right to Freedom of  Opinion 
and Expression, UN Doc. A/74/486, 9 October 2019, §§ 29, 34, 40–55, 57(b).
195 Human Rights Council, Surveillance and Human Rights: Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of  the Right to Freedom of  Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. A/HRC/41/35, 
28 May 2019, §§ 15–20, 29–38.
196 On this principle, see Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘The Concept of  “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’, 28 European Journal of  International Law (EJIL) (2017) 899; 
Ruggie and Sherman, ‘The Concept of  “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
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a legal framework that requires businesses to, in turn, exercise their own due dili-
gence.197 This is all the more important in the cyber context, since the Internet and 
other ICTs are mostly owned, controlled or designed by private entities.198
While states’ protective duties under IHRL are also subject to a requirement of  cap-
acity to act, common to other due diligence obligations,199 they may be ‘substantively 
… more demanding’ than those deriving from general international law, often includ-
ing duties to actively seek knowledge of  violations.200 Other distinctive features include 
jurisdictional triggers (Section 4.C.1); the type of  harms covered (Section 4.C.2); the 
knowledge requirement (Section 4.C.3); as well as the legal consequences of  a failure 
to protect applicable human rights (Section 4.C.4).
1 State Jurisdiction
Under some IHRL treaties, before states’ positive obligations in respect of  online or off-
line harms can be triggered, jurisdiction must be established.201 In IHRL, the concept of  
jurisdiction includes not only the territory of  the duty-bearer but also effective control 
over certain physical spaces, persons or events located extraterritorially. Considering 
the multi-layered and transnational nature of  cyberspace, comprising physical infra-
structure, logical systems, data  and human activity across multiple boundaries,202 
extraterritorial models of  jurisdiction are particularly relevant in the context of  states’ 
protective obligations under IHRL.
First, there is broad agreement that extraterritorial jurisdiction ‘follows’ individuals 
wherever a state exercises some form of  physical control or authority over them.203 
This is what is known as the ‘personal’ model of  extraterritorial jurisdiction and most 
human rights bodies204 and commentators205 agree that it applies to both negative and 
positive human rights obligations. Secondly, although not without contestation,206 
197 CESCR, General Comment No. 24, supra note 190, §§ 16–18, with respect to economic, social and cul-
tural rights, but with a principle that could be extended to civil and political rights as well; Besson, supra 
note 39, at 8.
198 Smith, ‘A Moment of  Reckoning: The Need for a Strong and Global Cybersecurity Response’, Microsoft 
on the Issues, 17 December 2020, available at https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/17/
cyberattacks-cybersecurity-solarwinds-fireeye/.
199 Besson, supra note 39, at 5–7.
200 Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 72, at 281–282, citing as an example CESCR, General Comment No. 
24, supra note 190, § 33.
201 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra not 184, art. 2(1); ECHR, supra not 184, art. 1; ACHR, supra not 184, art. 1(1).
202 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 454 n.88.
203 HRComm, General Comment No. 31, supra note 184, § 10.
204 See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR), Coard et al. v. United States, Report 
No. 109/99, 29 September 1999, para. 37; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v.  United Kingdom, Appl. no 
55721/07, Judgment of  7 July 2011, paras 136–139.
205 Milanovic, supra note 147, at 119. But the ECtHR has been reluctant to recognize this model in relation 
to extraterritorial kinetic force in the absence of  governmental control (see ECtHR, Banković and others 
v. Belgium and others, Appl. no 52207/99, Decision of  12 December 2001, paras 74–82; ECtHR, Al-Skeini 
and others v. United Kingdom, Appl. no 55721/07, Judgment of  7 July 2011, paras 136–137). For a recent 
analysis, see Milanovic, ‘The Murder of  Jamal Khashoggi: Immunities, Inviolability and the Human Right 
to Life’, 20 Human Rights Law Review (2020) 1, at 23–24.
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several human rights bodies have expressed the vew that jurisdiction may also be ex-
tended extraterritorially to the reasonably foreseeable human rights impact of  the 
activities of  entities, such as companies, which are incorporated or located in the 
duty-bearer’s territory, or otherwise subject to a state’s effective control.207 Thirdly, 
the Human Rights Committee has advanced a more expansive, ‘functional’ approach 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction, grounded in the exercise of  control over the enjoyment 
of  the rights in question, regardless of  any physical control over territory, the perpet-
rators or the individual victim.208
Arguably, the functional approach to jurisdiction is best suited to address contem-
porary forms of  effective control gained remotely through ICTs over victims, perpet-
rators and events.209 Thus, its appeal resides in the increased protection of  human 
rights, whose exercise increasingly depends on online systems. But while the functional 
model has received some support in respect of  negative human rights duties,210 many 
oppose its applicability to positive human rights obligations, fearing the lack of  neces-
sary government powers beyond a state’s territory or spatial control.211 Nevertheless, 
the practical impact of  this jurisdictional model should not be overstated: any pro-
tective obligation only extends insofar as the duty-bearer has the capacity to adopt 
the necessary measures in question.212 Capacity, in this context, includes the ability to 
influence the behaviour of  the perpetrators,213 or to predict events, the availability of  
207 HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 22, with respect to the right to life; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 14, supra note 162, § 39; CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Articles 
11 and 12 of  the Covenant), UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, § 33; CESCR, Statement on 
the Obligations of  States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic social and cultural rights, 
UN Doc E/C.12/2011/1, 20 May 2011, § 5; IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Requested by the 
Republic of  Colombia: The Environment and Human Rights, 15 November 2017, paras 101–102. See 
also Milanovic and Schmitt, supra note 72, at 264–265. Although this model of  jurisdiction may overlap 
with the requirement of  a state’s capacity to act, the two are grounded in different criteria and underly-
ing rationales. Jurisdiction captures the connection between the state and the protected human right on 
the basis of  effective control over different aspects of  this connection. Conversely, capacity to act limits 
a state’s protective obligations on the basis of  a range of  factors, including control over the activities or 
perpetrators in question, or a less demanding ability to influence their behaviour. See contra Besson, supra 
note 39, at 2.
208 HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 63.
209 See Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International 
Human Rights Law’, 7 Law & Ethics of  Human Rights (2013) 47.
210 Milanovic, supra note 147, at 209; Goodman, Heyns and Shany, ‘Human Rights, Deprivation of  Life and 
National Security: Q&A with Christof  Heyns and Yuval Shany on General Comment 36’ (2019), at 1–2, 
available at www.justsecurity.org/62467/human-life-national-security-qa-christof-heyns-yuval-shany-
general-comment-36/; Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v.  Uruguay, Human Rights Committee (HRComm) 
Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, § 12.3; Lilian Celiberti de 
Casariego v. Uruguay, HRComm Communication No 56/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 29 July 
1981, § 10.3; ECtHR, Issa and Others v. Turkey, Appl. no. 31821/96, Judgment of  16 November 2004, 
§ 71.
211 See, e.g., the account of  the debate in Milanovic, supra note 205, at 19–20; and Milanovic, supra note 
147, at 209, 210–212, 219–220.
212 For example, the ICESCR, supra note 184, has no express jurisdictional threshold and yet most of  its obli-
gations are positive ones, i.e. duties to protect and ensure social, economic and cultural human rights.
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resources and the duty to respect and protect other human rights.214 Of  course, there 
is a difference between a state having no jurisdiction at all and it being incapable of  
protecting human rights within its jurisdiction: in the latter case, the state’s capacity 
to act, along with other elements of  the obligation, must still be assessed. Yet, states 
are not required to do the impossible or to discharge a ‘disproportionate burden’215 but 
are expected to adopt measures that are reasonable in the circumstances.216 Thus, as 
in any other jurisdictional model, the requirement of  capacity to act overlaps with and 
modulates a state’s functional jurisdiction over human rights online.217
2 Type of Harm
Protective obligations under IHRL cover a wide spectrum of  harms, including any 
conduct by public or private entities that impairs the enjoyment of  human rights on-
line or offline, such as privacy and freedom of  expression. Unlike the no-harm prin-
ciple, the online harm in question need not have a transboundary nature: provided 
jurisdiction is established, a state must protect human rights regardless of  the harm’s 
origin or trajectory.
3 Knowledge Requirement
Given the multitude of  threats to human rights, it would be unrealistic and unrea-
sonable to expect a state to be in a position to adopt protective measures against any 
such threats. Rather, states are only capable and thus required to act in the presence 
of  some level of  knowledge that there is a risk to human rights. With respect to the 
right to life, the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights have stressed the requirement of  reasonable foreseeability of  threats218 and 
constructive knowledge of  an immediate and certain risk,219 respectively. Whilst these 
pronouncements were concerned with the protection of  the right to life, there is no 
particular reason not to extend them to positive obligations to protect other human 
rights, including in cyberspace. This means that, under IHRL, states must also exercise 
due diligence in actively seeking and evaluating available information about threats to 
human rights under their jurisdiction.220
214 Cf. ECtHR, Osman v.  United Kingdom, Appl. no.  87/1997/871/1083, Judgment of  28 October 1998, 
para. 116.
215 Ibid.; see also ECtHR, Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania, Appl. no. 41720/13, Judgment of  25 June 2019, 
para. 136.
216 ECtHR, McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 19009/04, Judgment of  27 September 1995, 
para. 151; Velasquez Rodriguez v.  Honduras, Judgment (Merits), 29 July 1988, para. 167. See also The 
Netherlands, Letter of  5 July 2019, supra note 62, Appendix, at 4; Comments by Member States on the 
initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report: Republic of  Korea, supra note 47, at 5.
217 Besson, supra note 39, at 5.
218 As, for instance, affirmed by the HRC with respect to the right to life. See HRComm, General Comment 
No. 36, supra note 43, § 21; cf. also ECtHR, Osman v.  United Kingdom, App. No. 87/1997/871/1083, 
Judgment of  28 October 1998, paras 115–116.
219 IACtHR, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v.  Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 
29 March 2006, § 155; cf. very similar language in ECtHR, Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v.  Romania, Appl. 
no. 41720/13, Judgment of  25 June 2019, para. 136.
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4 Legal Consequences of  a Failure to Protect Human Rights
Unlike the Corfu Channel and the no-harm principles, positive obligations to protect 
and ensure human rights are breached by the mere lack of  diligence, i.e. the wrongful 
omission or inaction in adopting the required measures.221 This is true to the extent 
that states must prevent objectively foreseeable threats to human rights.222 As such, 
the mere emergence of  a risk of  harm, regardless of  whether or not it materializes, 
may breach positive human rights obligations.223 Although the actual occurrence of  
the prohibited harm is generally indicative that the state has failed to exercise due 
diligence, proof  of  causation between the lack of  diligence and the harm is unneces-
sary. According to the ECtHR, a state’s knowledge of, acquiescence in or connivance to 
human rights violations perpetrated by third parties suffices to demonstrate a breach 
of  that state’s positive duties to protect those rights.224
Importantly, a breach of  positive human rights obligations arises not only from 
complete inaction but also from the adoption of  insufficient or ineffective measures, 
when more appropriate ones were available.225 Conversely, the occurrence of  the pro-
hibited harm does not necessarily mean that the state violated its due diligence obli-
gations under IHRL. A violation only arises if  it is proven that the state failed to adopt 
protective measures that it could have reasonably implemented.226
D Cyber Due Diligence in International Humanitarian Law
Cyber operations are by now part and parcel of  modern warfare. Whilst they may spe-
cifically target military infrastructure, cyber weapons and tactics have the potential to 
221 See, e.g., ibid., § 7.
222 Todeschini, ‘The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 36 and the Right to Life in 
Armed Conflict’, OpinioJuris (21 January 2019), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01/21/
the-human-rights-committees-general-comment-no-36-and-the-right-to-life-in-armed-conflict/.
223 This principle applies at the very least to the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture 
and ill-treatment (see, e.g., HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 7; ECtHR, Keller 
v. Russia, Appl. no. 26824/04, Judgment of  17 October 2013, para. 82; ECtHR, Osman v. United Kingdom, 
Appl. no.  87/1997/871/1083, Judgment of  28 October 1998, para. 116; ECtHR, O’Keeffe v.  Ireland, 
Appl. no.  35810/09, Judgment of  28 January 2014, paras 16, 162; ECtHR, Kurt v.  Turkey, Appl. 
no.  15/1997/799/1002, Judgment of  25 May 1998, para. 69. It also seems to apply to the right to 
non-discrimination, including in the context of  online hate speech (see Report of  the Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of  the right to freedom of  opinion and expression, UN Doc A/74/486, 
9 October 2019, §§ 13, 14(f), 16). See, generally, Stoyanova, ‘Fault, Knowledge and Risk Within the 
Framework of  Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 33 Leiden Journal 
of  International Law 601 (2020).
224 See European Commission of  Human rights (ECommHR), Yaşa v. Turkey, Appl. no. 22495/93, Report, 
8 April 1997, paras 106–107; ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, Appl. no. 23144/93, 16 March 2000, 
paras 38–46; ECtHR, Kılıç v. Turkey, Appl. no. 22492/93, Judgment of  28 March 2000, paras 57, 64, 68; 
EctHR, Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. no. 22535/93, Judgment, 28 March 2000, paras 74, 80, 85–92. 
All these cases are discussed in Milanovic, ‘State Acquiescence or Connivance in the Wrongful Conduct 
of  Third Parties in the Jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human Rights’ (15 September 2019), at 
3–6, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454007.
225 Cf. ECtHR, Hatton v. UK, Appl. no. 36022/97, Judgment of  8 July 2003, paras 138–142.
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intentionally or indiscriminately227 disable civilian infrastructure and disrupt the pro-
vision of  services essential to the civilian population. Many states228 and most com-
mentators agree that, at the very least, cyber operations having kinetic effects similar 
to those of  traditional uses of  armed force – for example, the destruction of  civilian 
objects or harm to civilians – are covered by the provisions of  IHL when carried out 
during an armed conflict.229 But it remains unclear whether, in the absence of  phys-
ical damage, the mere corruption of  data or functional system disruptions amount to 
attacks governed by IHL.230
Numerous rules of  IHL establish protective obligations requiring states to exercise 
due diligence.231 Of  particular relevance to ICTs are the obligations to ensure respect 
for IHL, including by third parties (Section 4.D.1), and adopt defensive precautions to 
avoid or minimize harm to civilian objects and the civilian population (Section 4.D.2).
1 The General Duty to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law in 
Cyberspace
A protective obligation is codified in Article 1 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on the Protection of  Victims of  War, which requires states to respect and 
ensure respect for the provisions of  the conventions232 – a provision repeated almost 
verbatim in Article 1(1) of  Additional Protocol I.233 The customary status of  this rule 
was recognized by the ICJ, as well as its application to both international and non-
international armed conflict.234 Given the erga omnes nature of  IHL, not only parties 
227 ICRC, Position Paper, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed 
Conflicts’ (2019), at 5, available at www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and- 
cyber-operations-during-armed-conflicts.
228 See, e.g., Jeremy Wright, UK Attorney General’s Office, Speech, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st 
Century’ (23 May 2018), available at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-
in-the-21st-century; Comments by Member States on the Initial Pre-Draft of  the OEWG Report: United 
States, supra note 47, at 2; Juul, supra note 2.
229 See, e.g., Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 82, para. 16; Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 86. See also Durham, ‘Cyber Operations During Armed Conflict: 7 
Essential Law and Policy Questions’, Humanitarian Law & Policyt (26 March 2020), available at https://
blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2020/03/26/cyber-armed-conflict-7-law-policy-questions/.
230 See Rödenhauser, ‘Hacking Humanitarians? IHL and the Protection of  Humanitarian Organizations 
Against Cyber Operations’, EJIL: Talk! (16 March 2020), available at www.ejiltalk.org/hacking-humani-
tarians-ihl-and-the-protection-of-humanitarian-organizations-against-cyber-operations/.
231 See Longobardo, ‘The Relevance of  the Concept of  Due Diligence for International Humanitarian Law’, 
37 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2020) 44; and Berkes, ‘The Standard of  “Due Diligence” as a 
Result of  Interchange between the Law of  Armed Conflict and General International Law’, 23 Journal of  
Conflict & Security Law (2018) 433.
232 Article 1 common to: Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of  
the Condition of  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  Armed Forces at Sea 1949, 75 UNTS 
85; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War, 75 UNTS 287.
233 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, art. 1(1).
234 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Judgment, 27 June 
1986, ICJ Reports (1987) 14, para. 220; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (2016), art. 1 
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to an armed conflict but all states are bound to do ‘everything in their power to en-
sure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied uni-
versally’.235 According to Rule 144 of  the International Committee of  the Red Cross’s 
(ICRC) Customary IHL Study,236 this obligation requires States not only to refrain from 
committing or encouraging violations of  IHL237 but also to take positive steps to en-
sure – even in peacetime238 – that other entities comply with IHL.239
This obligation also applies in cyberspace and entails a duty to act, as far as possible, 
to prevent and halt cyber operations constituting violations of  IHL. Its broad scope of  
application covers potential violations by state agents, as well as private entities over 
which a state exercises authority, such as populations under belligerent occupation,240 
or exerts a reasonable degree of  influence, including other states and non-state groups 
located in different parts of  the world.241
As with other protective obligations, the duty to respect and ensure respect for IHL 
is triggered and limited by a state’s capacity to act.242 This, in turn, depends on a range 
of  factors, such as available resources, the gravity of  the violation and the degree of  
control or influence that the state exercises over the direct perpetrators.243 Yet lack 
of  military, economic or other resources does not exempt states from what remains a 
binding legal obligation to acquire and employ all reasonable means to ensure respect 
for IHL, including in cyberspace.244 The duty is triggered not only by a state’s know-
ledge of  violations but also by objective foreseeability.245 However, though it arises from 
235 ICRC, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War: Commentary (1958), at 
16; Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
9 July 2004, ICJ Reports (2004) 136, paras 158–159.
236 J.-M. Henckaerts and L.  Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Law. Volume 1: Rules (2009), at 
509–513. Rule 139, instead, reproduces verbatim the language of  common Article 1, but it limits its 
scope of  application to armed forces and other entities acting on the instructions, or under the direction 
or control of  a party to the conflict. See ibid., at 495ff.
237 ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, paras 154. 158–163.
238 Ibid., paras 127–128 and 185.
239 Ibid., paras 121, 153–154, 164–173. On this obligation generally, see Dörmann and Serralvo, ‘Common 
Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law 
Violations’, 96 International Review of  the Red Cross (IRRC) (2014) 707. See also Longobardo, supra note 
231, at 57–60; and Berkes, supra note 231, at 442. See contra, see Zych, ‘The Scope of  the Obligation to 
Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law’, 27 Windsor Yearbook of  Access to 
Justice (2009) 251; Robson, ‘The Common Approach to Article 1: The Scope of  Each State’s Obligation to 
Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions’, 25 Journal of  Conflict and Security Law (2020) 101. On ex-
amples of  operational measures, see European Union, Updated European Union Guidelines on Promoting 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 2009/C 303/06, 15 December 2009, § 16.
240 ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, para. 150.
241 Ibid., paras 150, 153–154.
242 Ibid., paras 166, 187.
243 Ibid., paras 165–166 and, mutatis mutandis, Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 
2007, para. 430. See also Longobardo, supra note 231, at 60–62.
244 ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, para. 187.
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the moment IHL violations become known or foreseeable, a breach only occurs if  the 
actual harm materializes, like the Corfu Channel and no-harm principles.246
States may comply with this rule by simply adopting measures well-known in the 
law of  state responsibility, such as invoking a breach of  IHL by a third state through 
adjudicative or diplomatic means,247 demanding its cessation, guarantees of  non-
repetition or reparations,248 refraining from recognizing the situation as lawful and 
rendering assistance to the state in breach,249 as well as taking effective steps to inves-
tigate and redress the violations.250
2 The Duty to Adopt Protective Precautions against the Effects of  Cyber Warfare
The principle of  precaution enshrined in several IHL provisions also embodies a set of  
protective duties. Article 51 of  Additional Protocol I generally provides that ‘[t]he ci-
vilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dan-
gers arising from military operations’.251 It is immediately evident how cyber warfare 
may pose a challenge to the application of  such rule. To begin with, civilian cyber-infra-
structures may not be easily distinguishable from lawful military objectives, as these 
often depend on services and resources provided by private entities.252 The interconnec-
tivity of  cyberspace may also mean that cyberattacks directed against military object-
ives may spill over into civilian systems, causing disruption or loss of  functionality.253
To obviate such undesirable results, Article 58 of  Additional Protocol I  requires 
parties to a conflict to adopt precautionary measures to protect civilian populations 
and objects against the effects of  attacks, provided they exercise control over the ter-
ritory, physical infrastructure or, in our view, the operational systems which may be 
targeted.254 The rule has achieved customary status, as recognized by Rules 22–24 of  
the ICRC’s Study on Customary IHL, and is applicable not only in international armed 
conflict but also, arguably, in non-international ones.255
246 ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, para. 166 establishes a parallelism between common Article 
1 to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 231, and Genocide Convention, supra note 31, art. 1. The ICJ in 
Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 431, established that a breach 
of  the duty to prevent occurs only if  genocide is actually committed, in line with ARSIWA, supra note 20, 
art. 14(3).
247 ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, para. 181.
248 ARSIWA, supra note 20, art 48. Cf. ICRC, Memorandum to the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions 
of  12 August 1949 concerning the conflict between Islamic Republic of  Iran and Republic of  Iraq 
(1983), available at https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icrc-iraniraq-memoranda.
249 ARSIWA, supra note 20, arts. 16, 40–41; cf. ICRC, 2016 Commentary, supra note 234, paras 158–163.
250 Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 32.
251 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, art. 51. See generally Jensen, ‘Precautions against the Effects of  
Attacks in Urban Areas’, 98 IRRC (2016) 147; Quéguiner, ‘Precautions under the Law Governing the 
Conduct of  Hostilities’, 88 IRRC (2006) 793.
252 Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, art. 52(2).
253 See Gisel and Rodenhäuser, Cyber Operations and International Humanitarian Law: Five  Key Points (2019) 
available at https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/11/28/cyber-operations-ihl-five-key-points/.
254 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of  8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949 (1987), at 692, para. 2239.






/ejil/article/32/3/771/6356808 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2021
804 EJIL 32 (2021), 771–805 Articles
Along with other protective obligations, the duty to adopt precautions against the 
effects of  attacks is triggered and limited by a state’s capacity to act, only covering 
measures that are ‘practicable or practically possible’.256 In respect of  cyberattacks, 
this might require states to adopt, to the extent feasible, measures such as establishing 
a clear separation between military and civilian cyberinfrastructure and networks, 
identifying and protecting critical civilian infrastructure and services – such as those 
related to the provision of  medical assistance, electricity, telecommunications, trans-
port and distribution of  objects indispensable for the survival of  civilians – from poten-
tially disruptive cyber operations, such as by taking them offline.257
5 Conclusion: A Patchwork of  Primary Cyber Due 
Diligence Duties
Throughout this contribution, we have stressed that the concept of  due diligence is 
best understood as a flexible standard of  care or good governance found in a variety 
of  primary rules of  international law across a range of  areas. Thus, in a way, there is 
a patchwork of  different but overlapping protective obligations requiring diligent be-
haviour in cyberspace. Yet a set of  core elements also threads them together.
First, all protective obligations surveyed above presuppose the exercise of  state sov-
ereignty, jurisdiction or some level of  control over a territory, the right-holder, the 
perpetrator or the events in question.258 Secondly, and relatedly, those obligations are 
subject to and limited by a state’s capacity to act,259 which gives effect to the idea that 
states have common but differentiated responsibilities in international law.260 Thirdly, 
those flexible obligations of  conduct are coupled with obligations of  result to put in 
place the minimal legislative, judicial and executive infrastructure needed to exercise 
due diligence.261 Fourthly, a state is only required to act in the presence of  some degree 
of  information about the harm or risk in question, ranging from actual or constructive 
knowledge to objective foreseeability.262 Lastly, all these elements are geared towards a 
central duty to prevent, halt and/or redress harm or the risk thereof, consisting of  an 
256 Cf., e.g., US Department of  Defense, Law of  War Manual (June 2015, updated December 2016), at 192, § 
5.2.3.2.
257 Cf. ICRC, Position Paper, supra note 227, at 6.  See also Mačák, Gisel and Rodenhäuser, ‘Cyber Attacks 
against Hospitals and the COVID-19 Pandemic: How Strong Are International Law Protections?’, Just 
Security (2020), available at www.justsecurity.org/69407/cyber-attacks-against-hospitals-and-the-
covid-19-pandemic-how-strong-are-international-law-protections/.
258 ILA Study, supra note 14, at 5; HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 22.
259 Alabama Claims (United States v UK) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, supra note 15, at 129; ILA Study, supra note 
14, at 20, 47; HRComm, General Comment No. 36, supra note 43, § 21; Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 
26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, paras 430–432; Nicaragua, supra note 41, para. 157. See also 
Koivurova, supra note 9, paras 17, 19.
260 Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 19.
261 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 21, at 155–156, Commentary to art. 3, para. 17; art. 5 and 
Commentary; ILA Study, supra note 14, at 124; Alabama Claims (United States v UK) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, 
131; Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 21; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 14, at 26–27; Kolb, supra note 37, at 117, 
127; Couzigou, supra note 101, at 50–51; Okwori, supra note 50, at 223; Krieger & Peters, supra note 35.
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act contrary to the rights of  other states, significant transboundary harm or a viola-
tion of  more specific international rules, such as IHRL and IHL.
These common threads raise the following question, foreshadowed at the beginning 
of  this paper: is there a general principle of  due diligence in international law? Perhaps. 
This is what the ICJ seemed to imply when, in Pulp Mills, it stated that ‘the principle 
of  prevention is a customary rule, and as such it has its origins in the [standard of] 
due diligence that is required of  a State in its territory’.263 In the same vein, citing the 
Alabama Claims arbitration, the Trail Smelter arbitral tribunal held that both arbitra-
tions were decided on the basis of  the ‘same general principle’ according to which ‘[a] 
State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individ-
uals from within its jurisdiction’.264 The ILA265 and some states have also supported 
this position, particularly in the context of  cyberspace.266 But whether or not this 
holds true, it should not detract from the fact that a comprehensive legal framework 
of  binding protective obligations to prevent, halt and redress harm already applies in 
cyberspace, however patchy or fragmented it is.
Such framework comprises at least two different primary rules of  general inter-
national law, namely the Corfu Channel and the no-harm principles. In addition, dif-
ferent obligations of  due diligence arising under specialized branches of  international 
law apply concurrently to cover different uses, aspects and consequences of  ICTs. 
Among them, we have highlighted the positive obligation to protect human rights on-
line, as well as the duty to ensure respect for IHL and to adopt precautions against the 
effects of  cyberattacks in armed conflict.
While the said rules overlap and could be interpreted systematically, insofar as they 
work towards similar goals, they remain separate and should not be conflated. Each 
has different triggers, requirements and standards of  care. It may well be that, from 
their similarities, one can derive a general principle of  international law. Furthermore, 
states maintain the prerogative to develop – through conventional or customary inter-
national law – a new specialized duty containing a ‘cyber due diligence’ standard. 
This duty may well be modelled on any of the existing protective obligations or a mix 
thereof, mirroring Rule 6 of  the Tallinn Manual. Yet, in debates about diligent state 
behaviour in cyberspace, doubts about a general principle or a cyber-specific pro-
tective obligation should not be presented as an alternative to a legal vacuum. For 
international law already provides more than meets the eye: a patchwork of  protective 
duties that, together, require states to do their best to prevent, halt and respond to a 
wide range of  online harms.
263 Pulp Mills, Judgment, 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), para. 101 (emphasis added). See 
also ILA Study, supra note 14, at 6; Koivurova, supra note 9, para. 41; Couzigou, supra note 
101, at 39; Hankinson, ‘Due Diligence and the Gray Zones of  International Cyberspace Laws’, 
Michigan Journal of  International Law Blog (November 2017), available at www.mjilonline.org/
due-diligence-and-the-gray-zones-of-international-cyberspace-laws/.
264 Trail Smelter (United States v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1911, at 1963, 1965.
265 ILA Study, supra note 14, at 6.
266 See, e.g., Comments by Member States on the initial pre-draft of  the OEWG report, supra note 47, France 
(at 3), Republic of  Korea (at 2, 5); ‘International Law and Cyberspace: Finland’s National Positions’, at 4, 
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